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Preface 
This paper examines the distribution of production income between labour and 
capital. In particular, it looks for explanations for the fall in labour’s share of 
income in Australia since the turn of the millennium. An examination of the 
industry sources of change makes the origins of the fall in labour’s share — or more 
aptly, the rise in capital’s share — quite clear. The increase in the terms of trade and 
the associated investment boom in mining are revealed as driving the overall trend 
in labour’s share of income in Australia over the past decade. 
Jenny Gordon, Mike Woods and Shiji Zhao assisted in the development of the 
paper. Derek Burnell, from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, and Shawn Sprague, 
from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, assisted with data enquiries. 
Helpful comments on an earlier draft were received from Bob Gregory, from the 
Australian National University, and from Jenny Gordon, Shiji Zhao, Lisa Gropp and 
Noel Gaston of the Productivity Commission. 
Dean Parham was a part-time Visiting Researcher at the Productivity Commission 
from April 2012 to June 2013 when the research for this paper was undertaken. 
Until 2008, he was an Assistant Commissioner at the Commission, where he led a 
team engaged in research on Australia’s productivity. He was also a Visiting 
Researcher at the Commission in 2011. 
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Key points 
• The labour share of income fell by 4 or more percentage points in the 2000s. 
• However, labour was no worse off in the process. 
– Labour income grew at a faster rate in the 2000s than in the 1990s through 
stronger growth in both wages and employment. 
• The labour income share only fell because capital income growth accelerated even 
more. 
• The rise in the terms of trade meant that product prices rose faster than consumer 
prices. While labour received a smaller share of income at product prices, the slower 
growth in consumer prices meant that the real value of each dollar earned was worth 
more in terms of its purchasing power. This purchasing power effect (which was 
available to all income earners) more than outweighed the apparent reduction in 
labour’s share of national income. 
• The large rise in Australia’s terms of trade brought strong growth in real income —
even stronger than the growth in the ‘productivity decade’ of the 1990s.  
– This provided scope for growth in both labour and capital income to rise. 
• Other high-income countries also experienced a decline in the labour income share, 
but driven by a different set of factors. In other countries, growth in labour income 
has suffered.  
• The mining boom was overwhelmingly responsible for the fall in labour share in 
Australia: 
– Development of mining and associated capacity added to the economy’s capital 
stock, leading to more capital-intensive production overall. 
– Higher output prices for minerals (and construction) reduced the real cost of 
labour so that growth in real wages fell behind labour productivity growth. 
• The two other industries most affected by the mining boom — Construction and 
Manufacturing — served to increase the labour income share.  
– In Manufacturing, a slowdown in capital income growth meant the industry 
contributed more to labour income than to capital income at the aggregate level.  
– Construction had stronger growth in capital income than in labour income. 
However, because the industry is labour intensive, growth in Construction’s labour 
income had a greater effect on aggregate labour income than growth in its capital 
income had on aggregate capital income. 
• As the terms of trade now decline, the labour income share will rise. But with a more 
capital-intensive economy, the share is unlikely to revert fully to previous levels. 
• Action to restore the old labour income share or to recover ‘lost’ income share 
through wage rises would probably only have adverse consequences for 
employment and inflation and for industries already facing adjustment pressures. 
• With the prospect of declining terms of trade, a focus on productivity growth will be 
the way to sustain growth in real wages.  
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Overview 
Labour’s share of income fell sharply in the 2000s.  
However, labour was no worse off. Put succinctly, while labour got a 
proportionately smaller slice of the income pie, the real value of its slice continued 
to grow in absolute size and, indeed, at a faster rate. In fact, with more-rapid growth 
in employment and real wages, the real income of labour continued to grow 
unabated. 
The labour income share fell because there was an even greater acceleration in 
capital income growth. 
Over the first decade of the 2000s, the Australian economy benefited from one of 
the strongest lifts in its terms of trade ever seen. That shift in relative prices boosted 
growth in income for both labour and capital, changed the industry sources of 
income, lifted the rate of investment in capital and employment growth, and 
reallocated capital and labour between industries.  
In the process, the rise in the terms of trade brought about the fall in the labour 
income share. Essentially, the economy became more capital-intensive through the 
mining boom.  
The labour income share has fallen in other developed economies, and notably in 
the United States. But the experience is quite different from that in Australia. 
Growth in labour income in other countries has fallen and the reasons for the fall in 
labour share have to do with technological advance and globalisation, rather than 
the terms of trade. 
This study finds that the same ‘rule of thumb’ — that labour and capital tend to 
share proportionately in the growth in income — do not seem to apply in an 
economy experiencing an improvement in its terms of trade.  
There are aspects of the terms of trade shift that are still not fully understood. The 
implications for labour market adjustment, wage determination and income shares 
are important examples. In unpacking some of the drivers of change in the labour 
income share, this project is in large measure a foray into the ways in which the 
terms of trade shift brought structural change in the economy. The analysis is a 
start. It is not definitive and the details of findings should be taken as tentative and 
indicative. 
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Context: income growth and its sources  
Usually, growth in the volume of output (GDP) also indicates growth in real 
income. That is true when the terms of trade (the ratio of export prices to import 
prices) are stable. 
However, Australia’s terms of trade jumped by over 80 per cent in the first decade 
of the 2000s to levels hardly seen over the last 140 years. Export prices rose on the 
back of steep rises in the prices of mineral exports, while import prices fell with 
appreciation of the exchange rate and lower world prices for some products.  
The rise in the terms of trade lifted real incomes through two mechanisms. First, 
higher export prices meant a given volume of exports earned more income. Second, 
lower import prices raised the purchasing power or real value of Australian 
incomes. 
The terms of trade shift maintained — and in fact increased — the rate of growth in 
real income in the 2000s, despite a slowdown in output growth (figure 1). The terms 
of trade accounted for more than 20 per cent of real income growth over the decade. 
Figure 1 The terms of trade lifted real income growth beyond output 
growth in the 2000s 
per cent growth since 1959-60 (LHS), index 2010-11=100 (RHS) 
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Within the market sector 
As figure 2 shows, compared with the 1990s, the 2000s brought: 
• faster growth in total income  
• faster growth in both labour income and capital income 
• a stronger acceleration in the rate of growth in capital income than in the rate of 
growth in labour income. 
Figure 2 Growth in labour income lifted in the 2000s but growth in 
capital income lifted more 
average annual rates of growth in nominal income (per cent) 
 
The faster growth in income was not spread evenly over industries. 
• Mining and Construction contributed about two-thirds of the acceleration in 
market sector income growth.  
 Mining accounted for 40 per cent and Construction accounted for 25 per 
cent.  
• Manufacturing, Accommodation, Telecommunications and the Arts reduced 
their contributions to market sector income growth, compared with the 1990s.  
– Manufacturing had a small decline in contribution but, with strong growth 
elsewhere, its share of market sector income fell markedly over the 2000s. 
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The effects of the terms of trade boom are clearly evident in these relative industry 
movements. The more rapid income growth in Mining and Construction reflects 
higher minerals prices and the investment phase of the mining boom. The relative 
decline of Manufacturing partly reflects exchange rate pressures — a manifestation 
of the so-called ‘two speed economy’. 
The fall in the labour income share 
The labour income share is the proportion of gross income generated from the 
production of goods and services that is paid in labour costs, either in wages or in 
on-costs.  
The remainder of gross income is attributed to capital (assets owned by companies 
and proprietors). Capital income is gross income before any allowance for 
depreciation and before the payment of interest and tax. 
Obviously, a fall in the labour share means an equal rise in the capital share. 
The labour income share is not a ‘primary’ indicator of economic performance or 
economic wellbeing. Sometimes, however, a shift in share reflects underlying 
changes that can have important effects on employment, inflation and income 
distribution. 
It is important therefore to understand the underlying reasons for a change in 
income share.  
There was a large fall in the labour income share in Australia over the first decade 
of the 2000s. According to one Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) measure, the 
share fell by 4 percentage points from 57 per cent to 53 per cent over the first 
decade of the 2000s. According to other measures, the fall was even larger. The 
2000s fall followed a period in which the share was stable through the 1990s. 
The recent fall in the labour income share can be examined from different angles: 
• relative rates of factor income growth 
• changes in the relative quantities and prices of capital and labour 
• changes in real wage rates relative to labour productivity. 
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While the three ways of looking at changes in labour’s share are simply alternatives, 
taking these different perspectives helps to ensure that a comprehensive and robust 
explanation is found. It turns out that all three angles generate the same result.  
Disparity in factor income growth 
At its simplest, the labour income share fell in the 2000s because capital income 
grew faster than labour income (figure 2).  
The Mining sector accounted for all of the disparity between growth in capital 
income and growth in labour income at the aggregate level. The growth in Mining 
was principally in the form of capital income and added much more to growth in 
aggregate capital income than it did to growth in aggregate labour income. 
From this perspective, the mining boom accounted for all of the fall in the (market 
sector) labour income share. Other industries made much smaller positive and 
negative contributions that offset each other. 
Construction and Manufacturing — the two other industries most affected by the 
terms of trade rise — worked in the direction of increasing the labour income share. 
They made stronger contributions to aggregate labour income growth than to 
aggregate capital income growth. 
This industry pattern is explained further in box 1. 
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Box 1 Industry contributions to growth in labour and capital income 
Mining and Construction were the key sources of additional growth in income in the 
2000s. Manufacturing’s importance dwindled. 
Mining accounted for the entire fall in the labour income share 
Labour and capital both benefited in the mining sector. Mining is a capital intensive 
industry and is now the major source of capital income, receiving one in five dollars of 
capital income in the market sector. The growth in capital income in mining added 
much more to aggregate growth in capital income than its growth in labour income 
added to aggregate growth in labour income. And so, the Mining sector brought about 
a fall in the aggregate labour income share. 
Construction increased the labour income share 
Labour and capital both benefited in the Construction sector. The labour income share 
within the industry declined because growth in capital income exceeded growth in 
labour income. However, Construction is labour intensive and is now the most 
important source of labour income in the market sector. Its growth in labour income 
had greater effect on aggregate labour income than its growth in capital income had on 
aggregate capital income. And so, the sector served to increase the aggregate labour 
income share. 
Manufacturing increased the labour income share 
Manufacturing made a stronger contribution to labour income growth than to capital 
income. The sector is an important (but declining) source of both labour and capital 
income, but is more important to labour than it is to capital income. Since there was 
stronger growth in labour income than capital income, the sector served to increase the 
aggregate labour income share.  
 
‘Quantity’ versus ‘price’ effect 
The second way to view income shares is through changes in the ‘quantity’ ratio 
(capital-labour ratio) relative to the ‘price’ ratio (the wage rate to the rate of return 
on capital). The labour income share falls if the quantity ratio increases more 
rapidly than the price ratio. A fall could come about through capital deepening 
(more capital relative to labour) or an increase in returns to capital (relative to 
wages). 
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From this perspective, the 2000s fall in labour income share was due 
overwhelmingly to a quantity effect, rather than a price effect. This is based on the 
findings that: 
• growth in the capital-labour ratio was greater than growth in the price ratio in the 
2000s decade (figure 3) 
• growth in the capital-labour ratio accelerated from the 1990s, whereas growth in 
the price ratio was virtually the same as it was in the 1990s. 
Figure 3 The fall in the labour income share was due to a quantity effect 
rather than a price effect 
growth in the capital labour ration (𝐾
𝐿
) and in the wage rate of return ration 
(per cent per year) 
 
While the conclusion that additional capital deepening provides the main 
explanation remains firm, there is some uncertainty about the exact size of the 
quantity and price effects. Capital measurement issues suggest that the extent of 
capital deepening in the 2000s may be overstated and consequently the growth in 
the price ratio is overstated in the estimates based on the ABS National Accounts. A 
measurement problem arises where there are lengthy lags between investment in 
capital and its use in production combined with the very large acceleration in 
investment. This has been the case with the mining boom and the scale of 
investment has been so large that it may have affected aggregate estimates of capital 
growth.  
The additional capital deepening was primarily due to more rapid growth in capital. 
While use of capital and labour both grew more rapidly in the 2000s than in the 
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1990s, the acceleration in use of capital was greater than the acceleration in use of 
labour. 
The nominal wage rate and the nominal rate of return both grew more rapidly in the 
2000s than in the 1990s, according to the data used, but the acceleration in the two 
was equal in size. 
The Mining sector accounted for the entire gap between growth in the quantity ratio 
and growth in the price ratio. That was because investment in mining capacity 
added so much to the aggregate capital stock (much more than its increased use of 
labour added to aggregate hours worked). Mining did also lift the aggregate rate of 
return (relative to the wage rate), but this effect on the aggregate was neutralised by 
contributions in favour of wages in other industries.  
Again, other industries’ contributions offset each other and, again, Construction and 
Manufacturing had a positive effect on the labour income share. Construction added 
more to the use and reward of labour than to the use and reward of capital. 
Manufacturing reduced the use of labour, but increased wages, and increased 
capital, but reduced the rate of return. 
Real wage rates and productivity 
Some simple mathematics shows that a fall in the labour income share emerges 
whenever growth in real wages falls short of growth in labour productivity. While 
there is no necessary reason for real wages to grow in line with labour productivity, 
there has been a tendency for it to happen over the long term in advanced 
economies.  
The real wage in this context is the real cost to producers of employing labour. The 
nominal wage, deflated by product prices (the prices of goods and services 
produced), is referred to as the real product wage (RPW).  
The RPW showed weaker growth than labour productivity in the 2000s decade, 
leading to a decline in the labour income share (figure 4). Compared with the 1990s, 
growth in the RPW slowed more in the 2000s than did labour productivity. 
The same pattern of industry contributions is observed. Mining accounted for all the 
market sector disparity between growth in the RPW and in labour productivity (LP). 
Other industries offset each other. And Construction and Manufacturing made 
stronger contributions to RPW growth than to labour productivity growth. 
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Figure 4 The labour income share fell because of much weaker growth in 
the real cost of labour 
growth in the real product wage (RPW), labour productivity (LP) and the labour 
income share (LIS) (per cent per year) 
 
Product price inflation 
Growth in the real product wage fell further than productivity growth, not because 
of any slowdown in growth in nominal wages, but because of higher product price 
inflation (figure 5). 
The Mining sector was primarily responsible for the increase in product price 
inflation, as a result of the boom in mineral commodity prices. Construction also 
made a major contribution in the 2000s, well up on its 1990s contribution.  
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Figure 5 The lower real cost of labour was due to higher product price 
inflation  
growth rates in nominal wages, output prices and the real product wage (per cent 
per year) 
 
The decline in share has not been a macro phenomenon 
The Mining sector is so dominant in the explanations the question arises as to 
whether the fall in the labour income share can appropriately be considered a macro 
phenomenon. 
Figure 6 shows the extent to which the gap in growth between market sector labour 
productivity growth and growth in the real product wage stemmed from the mining 
sector. Mining made such a strong negative contribution to the labour income share 
because its contribution to growth in the RPW was so strongly negative. There was 
only one other industry (the Utilities) to make a negative contribution to RPW 
growth and that was relatively mild. In turn, Mining’s RPW contribution was so 
strongly negative because of the large rises in relative output prices in the industry. 
That is, the terms of trade effects on the labour income share were mostly played 
out in the Mining sector, where large rises in output prices sent the industry’s RPW 
contribution deeply negative. The effects of the terms of trade shift were not 
widespread. 
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Figure 6 The fall in labour share was a mining-specific rather than a 
general phenomenon 
 
Other perspectives 
Another terms of trade effect 
Although labour received a lower share of total income, the real value of each dollar 
of income increased. For ease, the discussion reverts to considering the growth in 
the RPW as a macro phenomenon. However, the point being made here does not 
depend on taking that view. 
The rise in the terms of trade drove a wedge between movements in product prices 
(prices of the goods and services that Australia produces) and consumer prices 
(prices of goods and services that Australians consume) (figure 7). Higher export 
prices, especially for minerals, fuelled strong growth in product prices, with little 
effect on domestic consumer prices, while cheaper imports helped keep rises in 
domestic consumer prices in check.  
This disparity in prices also drove a wedge between growth in real wages as a cost 
to producers (the real product wage) and growth in real wages as income to labour 
(the real consumption wage). The real consumption wage (RCW) deflates nominal 
wages by the consumer price index, rather than product prices. Consumer price 
inflation is relevant to those employed as it determines the real value or purchasing 
power of their incomes.  
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The lower growth in consumer prices meant that growth in the RCW was greater 
than growth in the RPW in the 2000s. While growth in the RPW fell behind growth 
in labour productivity, growth in the RCW did not (figure 8). This was especially 
true once the terms of trade started to rise from 2002-03  
And so, while labour received a less-than-proportionate share of income growth in 
the 2000s (measured at product prices), each dollar earned was worth more in 
purchasing power terms. The increase in purchasing power more than compensated 
for the gap between the growth in the RPW and in labour productivity (and 
therefore the fall in the labour income share). 
It is important to note, however, that this purchasing power gain was available to all 
income earners and from all sources of income. It was not confined to labour 
income, nor to workers in particular industries. 
Broader distribution and wellbeing  
As previously noted, shifts in the labour income share can reflect developments that 
have broader implications: 
• a decline in the labour income share can reflect conditions that are more 
favourable to employment growth 
– while demand conditions are usually the most important determinant of 
employment, a lower real cost of labour (relative to labour productivity) can 
lead to increased labour demand at the margin 
• a shift against labour can lead to a more unequal distribution of personal income 
– capital income is distributed more unequally than labour income 
– other research at the Productivity Commission has shown that, while the 
distribution of market incomes has become more unequal in Australia, the 
effects on the household distribution of income have been mitigated to a large 
extent by an increased rate of employment 
• a shift in share toward capital can also affect government tax revenues 
– capital income is taxed at a lower rate than personal income 
– however, a ‘scale’ effect appears to have dominated in Australia, with 
government revenues boosted by the strong growth in capital income. 
Foreign participation also has a bearing on what the income growth means for the 
wellbeing of Australians. The Mining sector has a high degree of foreign ownership 
and a large slice of the additional capital income accrues to foreign investors. 
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Figure 7 The terms of trade drove a wedge between product prices and 
consumption prices 
the GDP implicit price deflator and the consumer price index, 1999-00=100 
 
Figure 8 Growth in real wages as income was stronger than growth in 
the real cost of labour 
rates of growth over the first decade of the 2000s and from 2002-03 (per cent per 
year) 
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The fall in Australia’s labour share is distinct from falls in other 
countries  
The labour share has fallen in a number of advanced economies in the 2000s, 
reinforcing concerns about a fundamental shift in the distribution of income.  
Two explanations are prominent — globalisation and technological change. 
Globalisation is seen to have reduced employment opportunities and wage growth 
in advanced economies, especially for middle-income and middle-skill workers, 
through a large increase in the world supply of cheap labour and of cheaper goods. 
Technological change is seen to have brought substitution of capital (especially 
information and communications equipment) for unskilled labour.  
The way in which the pain of the global financial crisis has been distributed has 
undoubtedly also had an effect. 
But the Australian case is not part of the international trends. A few comparisons 
between Australia and the US, a prominent overseas case of a sharp decline in the 
labour income share, clearly indicate that different sets of factors have been at work 
in the two economies.  
It was the distribution of pain versus the distribution of plenty. The US had the 
burden of slow growth and contraction, whereas Australia had the bounty of even 
stronger expansion. 
There was a slowdown in growth in labour income in the US, but not in Australia. 
The labour income share fell in the US because labour income decelerated more 
than capital income did. The labour income share fell in Australia because the 
acceleration in labour income was overshadowed by the acceleration in capital 
income. 
The industry footprints of change in output and income growth were also very 
different. In the US, manufacturing was the major industry source of the 2000s 
income slowdown and shift in income share away from labour. In Australia, the 
mining boom was the principal source of additional income and of the fall in labour 
income share. And Manufacturing served to increase the labour income share in this 
country. 
While the presence of the structural pressures that have been at work in other 
economies cannot be ruled out, if they are present in Australia, they have been 
swamped by the effects of the mining boom. 
   
 OVERVIEW 17 
 
Capital productivity and income growth 
Ordinarily, productivity growth is the prime source of improvements in average 
living standards. This can be seen in the 1990s trends (when growth in real income 
per capita was closely aligned with growth in labour productivity (aside from the 
early-1990s recession). 
But growth in real income per capita continued unabated in the 2000s, even though 
labour productivity growth slowed (figure 9). That, of course, was due to the rise in 
the terms of trade. 
Capital productivity became a drag on overall productivity growth (figure 9). The 
decline in capital productivity reflects the fact that the economy has shifted to more 
capital-intensive production, especially through the Mining sector.  
Figure 9 Productivity growth needs to pick up if the same rate of growth 
in living standards is to be maintained 
cumulative growth since 1993-94 (per cent) 
 
While in isolation a fall in capital productivity would imply a poor allocation of 
capital leading to a loss of income and a deterioration in living standards, this does 
not appear to have happened over the past decade. First, the rise in the terms of 
trade has offset the effect of the decline in capital productivity on income growth. 
Second, these two developments are at least partly linked, as much of the 
investment in increased capital capacity was implemented to take advantage of the 
terms of trade (mineral price) gain.  
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Looking ahead 
Income growth 
Real income growth is unlikely to be boosted further by the terms of trade. If the 
terms of trade were to remain stable, income (and prosperity) would move in line 
with output growth. Any fall in the terms of trade, which is more likely, would 
detract from real income growth. 
Reinvigorated productivity growth will be needed to maintain the rate of 
improvement in Australian living standards. Labour productivity growth would 
have to return to something in the order of 2.5 to 3 per cent a year for growth in real 
average income to continue at around the same pace as it has over the past two 
decades. That would be the case if the terms of trade remained stable. If the terms of 
trade fall, additional productivity growth will be required. 
Some multifactor and more labour productivity growth will return whenever capital 
productivity eases its decline. The decline in mining’s capital productivity should 
ease, once major developments in the pipeline are completed and output comes fully 
on stream. The decline in capital productivity in other industries will slow to the 
extent that utilisation of infrastructure capacity rises, further infrastructure 
investments are economically wise, and the restructuring of industries and firms 
underway sees out its course.  
However, the extent to which capital productivity will halt its slide, and the timing, 
are quite uncertain.  
There are reports that, as minerals prices have started to come off, miners 
themselves are starting to focus more on containing costs and improving 
productivity. There are also reports that those firms and industries subject to 
adjustment pressures, especially from a higher exchange rate, are looking for 
avenues to improve productivity. 
The labour income share 
The labour income share is likely to rise. The extent of falls in commodity prices 
will be crucial. All other things being equal, price falls will: 
• reduce profits associated with resource rents 
• reduce incentives for further mining investment and expansion in capital 
capacity 
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• raise the real cost of employing labour and thereby reduce the tendency for 
growth in real product wages to fall behind growth in labour productivity. 
However, the share is unlikely to recover to its former level, at least in the medium 
term. The chief factor here will be the extent to which the economy remains more 
capital intensive. A greater intensity of capital use will command a greater 
proportion of income. When the dust settles and some new equilibrium is reached, a 
capital income share higher than it used to be is likely to be an offset for a level of 
capital productivity lower than it used to be. 
Should anything be done about the decline in labour income share? 
As noted, there is likely to be a partial recovery in the labour income share. 
Any attempts to restore the labour share (or catch up for past lost share) through 
general wage increases are likely to have negative impacts on employment and add 
to any inflationary pressures. They are likely to exacerbate the adjustment pressures 
that non-mining industries face. 
To the extent that labour did not share proportionately with capital in the gains over 
the 2000s, this was largely confined to the mining sector.  Many of the gains to 
capital are likely to be transient and will fall away with lower terms of trade. If there 
is an issue, it is probably more to do with how transient gains from resource rents 
have been shared across the community.  
Wage growth without productivity growth is not sustainable. With declining terms 
of trade, a focus on reinvigorating productivity growth would provide the conditions 
for sustainable growth in real wages. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Focus of the paper 
This paper is about the sources of growth in income in Australia and their effects on 
structural change and the distribution of income between labour and capital.  
The main objective is to find an explanation for the fall in the labour share of 
income in Australia in the 2000s.  
A change in the labour income share is worth investigating. While the labour 
income share is not a ‘primary’ indicator of economic performance or economic 
wellbeing, a shift in the share can reflect underlying changes that can have 
important effects on employment, inflation and income distribution.1  
The labour income share has fallen in quite a few high-income countries over the 
2000s, which raises a question of whether Australia’s fall reflects the same 
underlying causes as in other countries such as the US. This is also investigated. 
1.2 Approach 
Proximate explanations 
The analysis in the paper looks for immediate or proximate explanations for 
changes in the labour income share. It deals only with the obvious underlying 
causes. The fall in the labour income share is examined in three ways: 
• as a divergence in growth between labour income and capital income 
                                              
1 The labour share of income is quite different from the distribution of income (the distribution of 
income from all sources and after redistributive action is taken via the tax and transfer system). 
A recent paper by Commission staff (Greenville, Pobke and Rogers 2013) found that there had 
been a widening in the distribution of market incomes in Australia. However, the effects on the 
personal and household distribution of income have been mitigated to a large extent by 
movements of the population into employment. 
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• whether the changes in relative income growth reflect quantity changes (use of 
capital and labour inputs) or price changes (wage rates and rates of return on 
capital 
• as a divergence in growth between the real cost of labour and labour 
productivity.  
These three approaches can be applied at a macro or aggregate level. But it is also 
very instructive to examine them at an industry level. 
A ‘growth accounting’ approach is used. This provides a statistical breakdown of 
contributions to changes in the labour income share and in other variables. It does 
not provide a causal analysis of relationships. For example, while a fall in the labour 
income share can be decomposed into contributions from growth in real wages and 
labour productivity, there are no means to tell the direction of any causal link 
between wages and productivity.  
Industry contributions 
At an aggregate level, changes in the labour income share can reflect similar trends 
across all industries or large changes in some industries relative to others. The 
analyses in the paper pay particular attention to the industry sources of change in 
income flows. The idea is to keep a focus on what has happened to growth in 
income at the aggregate level, but to identify from which industries that growth has 
come. An industry contribution is the growth in income in an industry weighted by 
the importance of the industry in generating aggregate income. 
The calculation of industry contributions uses ‘chained Tornqvist aggregation’, 
developed in Parham (2012). This method enables a high degree of precision in the 
calculation of industry contributions over an interval of years. The additivity in the 
approach also enables contributions to be disaggregated — for example, an income 
contribution can be disaggregated into a quantity component and a price 
component. The use of the method in this paper is laid out in appendix A. 
Comparison periods 
Comparison of growth rates over two decades is key to understanding the factors 
behind the change in the labour income share in the 2000s. The analysis compares 
the 1990s (1989-90 to 1999-00) to the 2000s (1999-00 to 2009-10).  
These periods are arbitrary, but they do allow a comparison between a period 
dominated by productivity growth (the 1990s) with a period dominated by a terms 
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of trade shock (the 2000s). However, these decadal periods do not correspond to 
productivity cycles, as used in determining underlying productivity trends, nor to 
turning points in the terms of trade. 
Data sources 
Nearly all data are sourced from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 
Australian National Accounts. The productivity database within the national 
accounts is used extensively. This means that the analysis is confined to the market 
sector of the economy, rather than the economy as a whole. And, since data for the 
16-industry market sector do not span the whole of the 1990s, data for the 
12-industry market sector are used. 
Some caution is required in taking firm conclusions from some aspects of the 
analyses. The national accounts data are used in this paper to derive wage and rate 
of return estimates, a purpose for which they are not primarily designed. Greater 
caution is required in regard to industry estimates. They have not been separately 
cross-checked against direct survey estimates. 
1.3 What the paper does 
Although the paper is about how the income ‘pie’ has been sliced, it is important to 
keep in mind how rapidly the ‘pie’ has been growing. The next chapter outlines the 
trends in income growth over the 1990s and 2000s. It also highlights changes in the 
sources of growth in income over the two decades, in the first instance, in terms of 
productivity and terms of trade determinants, and then in terms of changes in the 
industry sources of income growth. 
Chapter 3 presents definitional, historical and international perspectives on the 
labour income share as a prelude to delving in later chapters into the explanations 
for the recent fall in Australia. It also includes a comparison of economic 
developments in Australia and the US in the 2000s as a way of addressing the 
question of whether the fall in labour share in Australia reflects the same 
developments as those that have occurred in other countries. 
Chapter 4 deals with the decline in Australia’s labour income share from the three 
perspectives set out above at the aggregate level. 
Chapter 5 starts the industry analysis. It examines the industry sources of factor 
income growth and undertakes ‘shift-share analysis’ of the contributions of shifts of 
income between industries and shifts in labour shares within industries. It finds 
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limitations in this approach for the current purpose and puts forward an alternative 
analysis based on industry contributions to the disparity in growth between labour 
income and capital income at the aggregate level. 
Chapter 6 continues the industry analysis. It examines industry contributions to the 
changes in factor proportions and factor rewards (or ‘quantity versus price’) 
explanation for the fall in the labour income share. It also examines the industry 
contributions to the relative growth in productivity and costs. 
Chapter 7 investigates another implication of the shift in the terms of trade. It drove 
a wedge between prices of the goods and services produced in Australia and prices 
of the goods and services consumed in Australia. This in turn drove a wedge 
between growth in real wages as a cost to producers and growth in real wages as 
income to labour. 
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2 Income and its sources 
This paper is about changes in the shares of the production income ‘pie’. But, 
before examining shares in detail, it is important to look at how rapidly the pie has 
been growing.  
This chapter outlines the trends over the 1900s and 2000s. 
• Section 2.1 observes that growth in income has been strong over both decades. 
• Section 2.2 illustrates the role of two key sources of income growth — 
productivity and the terms of trade. 
• Section 2.3 unearths the industry sources of income growth. 
• Section 2.4 provides a summary.  
2.1 Growth in output, income and prosperity 
The volume of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is usually taken as a measure of both 
the volume of output and the real income generated from the production of goods 
and services. As a volume or real measure, it strips out the effects of inflation on the 
growth in income.1 
However, the GDP measure overlooks shifts in the terms of trade (the ratio of 
export to import prices), which also have real income effects. A rise in the terms of 
trade can come about because export prices rise and so the same volume of goods 
and services produced for export earns more income. The terms of trade also rise if 
the price of imports fall, which means all income received here can be used to 
purchase a greater volume of imported goods and services. Since the command over 
the purchase of goods and services rises, the real value of a given amount of 
nominal income rises.  
Gross Domestic Income (GDI) is a measure of real income that includes terms of 
trade effects. It can be thought of as real GDP adjusted for movements in the terms 
                                              
1 Chained volume measures, as reported here, also take account of structural change by 
incorporating annual updates of industry shares in the total economy. 
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of trade. GDP continues to be a measure of the volume of output in the presence of 
terms of trade shifts, but GDI is a better measure of real income. 
Growth in output and income 
Growth in GDP and GDI are compared in figure 2.1. The observations for any year 
show the cumulative growth in GDP and GDI since 1959-60. 
The decade of the 2000s was a period of very strong income growth. Annual 
average growth in GDI, at 3.9 per cent, was faster than in the 1990s (3.2 per cent) 
and faster than in any decade since the halcyon years of the 1960s (table 2.1). In 
fact, the average growth rate over the 2000s decade would have been even stronger 
if it were not for the slight dip in 2009-10 associated with the global financial 
crisis.2 
Real income (GDI) growth was 0.9 of a percentage point a year stronger than 
growth in the volume of output (GDP) in the 2000s decade. After decades of very 
similar trajectories (figure 2.1 and table 2.1), GDI growth accelerated from its 1990s 
rate, while GDP growth slowed. 
Growth in prosperity 
Prosperity and living standards are typically measured in terms of average income 
— income per capita. Again, GDI per capita is a better measure of real average 
income than GDP per capita in the presence of large shifts in the terms of trade.3 
There was stronger growth in prosperity in the 2000s. The annual rate of growth in 
GDI per head rose from 2.0 per cent a year in the 1990s to 2.4 per cent.4 
                                              
2 The average annual rate of growth in GDI from 1999-00 to 2010-11 was 4.1 per cent. 
3 Net national disposable income per person is an even better measure of prosperity and living 
standards. Net national disposable income adjusts GDP for shifts in the terms of trade, nets out 
depreciation and takes account of net income flows to foreigners. It indicates the real net income 
available to Australians. 
4 The average over the 1990s was, however, lowered somewhat by the decline in average income 
during the early-1990s recession. 
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Figure 2.1 Cumulative growth in Australia’s GDP and GDIa and the terms 
of trade index, 1959-60 to 2011-12 
per cent (left hand side) and index 2009-10=100 (right hand side) 
 
a The chain volume GDP and real GDI series show cumulative growth since 1959-60. 
Data source: ABS (Cat. no. 5204.0). 
Table 2.1 Average growth in Australia’s real GDP and GDI over decadesa 
per cent per year 
Decade GDP growth rate GDI growth rate 
1960s 5.0 5.2 
1970s 3.0 3.3 
1980s 3.4 3.5 
1990s 3.3 3.2 
2000s 3.0 3.9 
a Calculated over 10 years. For example, for the 1960s, from 1959-60 to 1969-70. 
Source: ABS (Cat. no. 5204.0). 
2.2 Sources of growth 
The 1990s were the ‘productivity decade’ and the 2000s were the ‘terms of trade 
decade’. 
Income, productivity and the terms of trade 
The divergence between GDI and GDP growth demonstrates that the terms of trade 
were an important source of real income growth in the 2000s. The terms of trade 
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rose by 85 per cent after 2002-035 (figure 2.2) to a level hardly witnessed over the 
last 140 years.6 Export prices rose with the growth in export demand, particularly 
for minerals, while import prices fell with exchange rate appreciation, increased 
world supplies from lower-cost countries and technological advances in overseas 
production of electronic equipment.  
The rise in the terms of trade accounted for over 20 per cent of the average annual 
growth in GDI over the first decade of the 2000s.7  
The terms of trade more than replaced the gap in real income growth left by slower 
productivity growth. Productivity growth was the major contributor to real income 
growth in the 1990s. GDP per hour worked in the economy as a whole — a broad 
indicator of labour productivity — contributed 2.1 percentage points, or about two-
thirds, of the GDI growth (table 2.2). However, growth in GDP per hour worked fell 
by 0.7 of a percentage point on average over the course of the 2000s decade. Yet, as 
already noted, the rise in the terms of trade not only maintained growth in GDI, but 
also helped (along with stronger hours growth) to push it higher. 
Table 2.2 Decomposition of average annual growth in GDI 
per cent per year 
  1989-90 
 to 1999-00 
1999-00  
to 2009-10 
Change 
MFP growth (MS12)a 1.7 0.4 -1.3 
 + capital deepening  1.2 1.8 0.6 
= Labour productivity growth (MS12)a 2.9 2.1 -0.8 
 + market sector adjustment  -0.8 -0.7 0.1 
= GDP per hour growth (economy-wide) 2.1 1.4 -0.7 
 + hours worked growth  1.2 1.6 0.4 
= GDP growth 3.3 3.0 -0.3 
 + terms of trade contribution  -0.1 0.9 1.0 
= GDI growth 3.2 3.9 0.7 
a 12-industry market sector. 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
                                              
5 The terms of trade index rose from 54.5 in 2002-03 to 100 in 2010-11 and 100.6 in 2011-12 
(ABS Cat. no. 5204.0, 2011-12 issue). 
6 There were spikes in the 1920s and in the early 1950s (PC 2012, chapter 11 and Plumb, Kent 
and Bishop 2013).  
7 0.9 percentage points out of 3.9 per cent per year growth. 
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Average income 
The same trends are evident in growth in real income per capita (figure 2.2). 
Average income grew closely in line with productivity growth in the 1990s. Growth 
in GDI per capita averaged 2.0 per cent and growth in GDP per hour averaged 2.1 
per cent. In the 2000s decade, however, GDI per capita accelerated to 2.4 per cent a 
year, thanks to the terms of trade rise, even though growth in GDP per hour 
slumped to 1.4 per cent a year. 
Figure 2.2 GDP per hour, GDI per person and the terms of trade 
indexes, 1999-00=100 (LHS) and 2010-11=100 (RHS) 
 
Data source: ABS (Cat. no. 5204.0). 
Productivity in the market sector 
Labour productivity growth is more accurately measured in the market sector of the 
economy (box 2.1). (The reasons for using the market sector in this paper will 
become clear in chapter 4.) Market sector labour productivity growth was more 
rapid in the 1990s than growth in GDP per hour worked (reflecting faster labour 
productivity growth in the market than the non-market sector of the economy), 
although market sector labour productivity fell by a similar magnitude in the 2000s 
decade (table 2.2). 
Labour productivity growth can be viewed as a combination of capital deepening 
and multifactor productivity (MFP) growth. Capital deepening occurs with 
increases in the ratio of capital to labour. MFP growth reflects improvements in the 
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efficiency with which labour and capital are used to produce outputs of goods and 
services.8  
 
Box 2.1 Industries in the market sector 
The market sector is the part of the economy for which the ABS calculates the official 
productivity estimates. The key distinguishing feature of market sector industries is that 
their output can be measured without reference to the amount of inputs used. Output is 
valued by prices received in market transactions. In non-market industries — Public 
administration & safety, Education & training and Health care & social assistance —
output is largely measured by expenditure on inputs. 
The ABS introduced four additional industries into the market sector productivity 
estimates in 2010. The data for the four additional industries span a shorter period 
(from 1994-95) than for the 12 industries in the original market sector. 
12-industry market sector 
• Agriculture, forestry & fishing (Agriculture) 
• Mining 
• Manufacturing 
• Electricity, gas, water & waste services (EGWWS or ‘the Utilities’) 
• Construction 
• Wholesale trade 
• Retail trade 
• Accommodation & food services (Accommodation) 
• Transport, postal & warehousing (Transport) 
• Information media & telecommunications (Telecoms) 
• Financial & insurance services (Finance) 
• Arts & recreation services (Arts & recreation) 
Additional industries in the 16-industry market sector 
• Rental, hiring & real estate services  
• Professional, scientific & technical services 
• Administration & support services 
• Other services  
 
                                              
8 Output per hour worked (labour productivity) will improve if one person is supplied with a 
truck to shift dirt, as a substitute for a wheelbarrow. That is a labour productivity gain from 
capital deepening. If the one person is supplied with a truck and a co-worker, there will still be 
capital deepening (in comparison to the initial situation with the sole wheelbarrow operator), but 
the addition of the co-worker will cause MFP to fall because of ‘capital congestion’. Only one 
person can drive the truck. The other person is ‘idle’. If, however, output is measured over two 
shifts and the two workers can drive the truck in separate shifts, MFP will rise because labour 
and capital are combined in a way that improves production efficiency.  
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The fall in labour productivity growth in the market sector between the decades was 
overwhelmingly due to slower MFP growth. Over half the labour productivity 
growth was due to very rapid MFP growth in the 1990s. But the MFP contribution 
was very low over the 2000s decade.9 For much of the later decade, MFP was static 
or fell. 
Capital productivity 
A fall in capital productivity since 2003-04 has been a major development in 
productivity trends (figure 2.3). Capital productivity was generally flat over the 
1990s and early 2000s. This is the typical pattern.10 But it has fallen about 20 per 
cent since 2003-04.  
The fall in capital productivity has held back growth in MFP. MFP can be thought 
of as a weighted average of labour productivity and capital productivity. With 
declining capital productivity, MFP growth stalled after 2003-04. 
All other things being equal, the decline in capital productivity would mean a 
decline in income. The McKinsey Global Institute (Taylor et al. 2012) put an order 
of magnitude on this effect, estimating that the decline in capital productivity from 
2005 and 2011 represented a deduction of some $43 billion dollars from national 
income. 
But, all other things were not equal. That fall in capital productivity is based on the 
volume of output. As has already been noted, there was more income growth in the 
2000s through the terms of trade. And so, the rise in the terms of trade more than 
‘compensated’ for the lower income growth due to lower productivity and output 
growth.  
 
                                              
9 Table 2.2 reports the growth rates in productivity over the 1990s and the 2000s. These do not 
indicate underlying trends measured, for example, over productivity cycles as reported in the 
ABS National Accounts. 
10 Capital productivity was generally flat over two decades from around 1983-84 to 2003-04. What 
determines the level of capital productivity and why it tends to be flat is a complicated story 
(Mohun 2009). The following may be at least a partial explanation. In the medium term, a rise 
in capital productivity would imply an increase in output and income returns to capital, which 
would tend to induce more investment, leading to a fall in returns or reversion to average capital 
productivity. Over the longer term, diminishing returns to increased capital intensity tend to be 
offset by improvements in technology and other efficiency enhancements. 
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Figure 2.3 Labour, capital and multifactor productivity 
indexes, 1999-00=100 
 
Data source: ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0.55.002). 
2.3 Industry sources of income growth 
Did the additional income growth come from a range of industries or just a few? 
Growth in income at the industry level for market sector industries is explored using 
a nominal gross value added measure of output and income. The use of nominal 
values takes account of the effects of terms of trade shifts on income.11 
Industry growth and distribution 
There was considerable diversity in income growth across market sector industries 
in the 2000s. Growth rates over the decade ranged from 3.2 per cent a year in 
Agriculture and Manufacturing to 12.2 per cent per year in Mining. The range was 
around a market sector average of 6.6 per cent a year (table 2.3).  
As a result of the diversity, there were some major reallocations of activity and 
income among industries. 
                                              
11 Use of nominal values also means that ‘general’ inflation effects (as opposed to relative price 
changes) are taken into account. General inflation effects do not intrude much into comparisons 
of growth rates across industries or into assessments of industry contributions to aggregate 
income growth. 
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Mining’s growth, at over 12 per cent a year, was a large step up from 4 per cent a 
year growth over the previous decade (table 2.3). In growing so strongly in the 
2000s, it lifted its share of market sector income by 5 percentage points to 12 per 
cent. 
Construction and Financial and insurance services (Finance) had strong growth at 
just over 8 per cent a year. In the case of Construction, this was a step up from 
growth in the 1990s, but it was a slight drop for Finance.  
Finance had become the largest industry in the market sector by 2009-10, 
accounting for over 15 per cent of output and income. Construction and Mining had 
moved to similar sizes (each around 12 per cent of the market sector), just behind 
Manufacturing (around 14 per cent). 
Manufacturing was the big loser in terms of market sector share. Its share of market 
sector output and income fell 5.5 percentage points. 
Table 2.3 Industry growth in nominal value added and industry shares: 
1990s and 2000s 
per cent average annual growth over the decade 
 Growth rate  Industry share 
 1990s 2000s Change  1999-00 2009-10 change 
Agriculture 1.8 3.2 1.4  5.0 3.6 -1.4 
Mining 4.1 12.2 8.0  6.8 12.0 5.1 
Manufacturing 3.1 3.2 0.1  19.0 13.6 -5.5 
Utiliies 1.0 6.0 5.0  4.0 3.7 -0.2 
Construction 4.0 8.4 4.4  10.1 12.2 2.0 
Wholesale 4.5 5.7 1.2  7.7 7.0 -0.7 
Retail 5.1 5.8 0.7  7.9 7.3 -0.6 
Accommodation 7.3 5.7 -1.7  4.2 3.8 -0.4 
Transport 4.3 6.7 2.4  7.9 8.0 0.1 
Telecoms 6.6 5.0 -1.6  6.1 5.2 -0.9 
Finance 8.7 8.1 -0.6  13.3 15.5 2.3 
Arts & rec 4.8 6.7 1.9  8.0 8.1 0.1 
Market sector 12 4.5 6.6 2.0  100.0 100.0  
Source: Author’s estimates based on ABS national accounts. 
Industry contributions to growth in total income 
The industry sources of growth in market sector income can be tracked through 
‘industry contributions’. An industry’s contribution is the growth in income 
generated in the industry, weighted by the industry’s share in market sector income 
(box 2.2). 
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The industry contributions to the market sector’s average annual rate of growth over 
the decades of the 1990s and 2000s are shown in figure 2.4 and the estimates are 
presented in table 2.4. 
The three biggest sources of income growth in the 2000s were Finance and Mining 
(each around 18 per cent of market sector growth) and Construction (14 per cent).  
Most of the additional income growth in the 2000s was generated in Mining and 
Construction. Of the additional 2 percentage points in annual average growth in 
market sector income, Mining contributed 40 per cent and Construction 25 per cent. 
Because Finance made a strong contribution in both the 1990s and the 2000s, it did 
not add nearly as much to the acceleration in income growth over the two decades.  
 
Box 2.2 Industry contributions to market sector growth 
Measures of ‘industry contributions’ are used a lot in this paper. Clarity about what they 
mean is therefore paramount. 
The basic idea behind an industry contribution is that it reflects the magnitude of the 
effect an industry has on growth in a market sector variable. An industry contribution 
takes account not only of the rate of growth in the variable within the industry, but also 
how important the industry is in the market sector. 
For example, contributions to growth in market sector income in the 2000s are 
essentially growth in industry income (second column in table 2.3) multiplied by an 
industry share (as also shown in table 2.3). 
The practical problem is which industry share to use — base period, end period or mid-
period? Selection makes a difference to the size of computed contributions. 
Regardless of selection, industry contributions are unlikely to add up to the market 
sector growth over the period, especially if there are large variations in growth rates 
across industries and therefore relatively large movements in shares over the decade. 
There is a way to get around this problem — ‘chained Tornqvist aggregation’ as 
developed in Parham (2012). The idea is to calculate annual growth in industry income 
and use annual share weights and then accumulate and average the weighted annual 
changes over the decade. As a result, the industry contributions over the decade sum 
very closely to the growth in the market sector total over the decade. 
Details of the method are provided in appendix A.   
 
The importance of the mining boom 
The footprints of the mining boom are clearly evident. The rise in commodity prices 
raised income growth in Mining and stimulated a boom in mine development to 
raise mining capacity. The Construction industry benefited from the construction 
phase of the mining boom. While Manufacturing’s share of activity has been in 
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decline for some time, the decline is likely to have been exacerbated by the higher 
exchange rate associated with the mining boom. 
Figure 2.4 Industry contributions to growth in market sector income, 
1990s and 2000sa 
percentage points 
 
a 1989-90 to 1999-00 and 1999-00 to 2009-10. 
Data source: Author’s estimates based on National Accounts. 
Table 2.4 Industry contributions to growth in market sector income, 
1990s and 2000s 
   Change 
 1990s 2000s Percentage points Per cent 
Agriculture 0.07 0.16 0.09 4 
Mining 0.29 1.13 0.84 41 
Manufacturing 0.64 0.56 -0.08 -4 
Utilities 0.05 0.23 0.18 9 
Construction 0.37 0.89 0.51 25 
Wholesale 0.35 0.43 0.07 4 
Retail 0.40 0.45 0.05 2 
Accommodation 0.28 0.22 -0.06 -3 
Transport 0.35 0.54 0.19 9 
Telecoms 0.38 0.28 -0.10 -5 
Finance 0.96 1.15 0.19 9 
Arts & rec 0.40 0.54 0.14 7 
Market sector 12 4.5 6.6 2.0 100 
Source: Author’s estimates based on National Accounts. 
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2.4 Key point summary 
• Australia’s ‘income pie’ grew quite quickly in both the 1990s (the ‘productivity 
decade’) and the 2000s (the ‘terms of trade decade’).  
– Growth in real income and real income per capita were stronger in the 2000s 
than in the 1990s. 
• The stronger growth in the 2000s was due to the very large rise in the terms of 
trade. 
– Real income growth was stronger in the 2000s, even though output growth 
was weaker. 
– Productivity growth was the major propellant of prosperity, or improvements 
in average living standards in the 1990s. But the terms of trade more than 
filled the gap left by slower productivity growth in the 2000s. 
– The terms of trade accounted for over 20 per cent of the growth in real 
income in the 2000s. 
• A decline in capital productivity was the major proximate factor holding back 
productivity growth in the 2000s. 
– Ordinarily, a decline in capital productivity would mean a decline in income 
associated with output growth.  
– But there has been income growth due to the terms of trade gains.  
• The additional income growth in the 2000s was largely generated in the Mining 
and Construction industries. 
– The pattern of reallocation of income among industries points to the mining 
boom as being a driving influence. 
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3 The labour share: historical and 
international perspectives  
Attention now turns to income shares.  
• Section 3.1 explains the nature of the labour income share. 
• Section 3.2 sets the context for the 2000s experience by briefly reviewing 
historical and international trends in the labour income share. 
• Section 3.3 compares economic conditions in the Australian and US economies.  
– This helps to address the issue of whether the recent fall in Australia’s labour 
income share is part of an international trend. 
• Section 3.4 provides a summary. 
3.1 What is the labour income share? 
The labour income share is the proportion of income generated from production that 
is allocated to labour in wages and on-costs.1 Labour income is measured in gross 
terms, with no allowance for tax liabilities incurred. 
Shares are calculated as a proportion of current price gross value added (GDP at the 
economy-wide level). Current price value added (as opposed to the volume of value 
added) includes terms of trade effects on production.2  
  
                                              
1 According to ABS conventions, labour income covers wages, salaries and supplements such as 
allowances, bonuses and overtime payments and indirect payments such as employer 
contributions to superannuation and workers’ compensation schemes, and payments in kind. All 
forms of employment are included — casual, permanent, full- and part-time. Remuneration 
packages to senior executives are also included. 
2 Current producer prices reflect increases in export prices received and lower import prices paid 
on intermediate inputs. 
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The use of value added as the income measure means that all non-labour income is 
attributed to capital. This means that capital income is a measure of gross returns to 
capital, before deductions of tax, depreciation and interest.3 
This division between capital and labour income requires an allocation of 
proprietors’ income (Krueger 1999). The income of proprietors, labelled gross 
mixed income in national accounts data, combines a capital component (return on 
proprietors’ capital) and a labour component (return to proprietors’ labour input). 
Figure 3.1 gives an idea of the importance of gross mixed income relative to income 
received by incorporated businesses (gross operating surplus) and labour costs.  
The allocation task can be approached in a number of ways (which accounts for 
some of the imprecision in estimates and differences across sources of estimates).4  
Figure 3.1 Share of income going to employees, companies, and 
proprietors 
per cent 
 
Data source: ABS (Cat. no. 5204.0). 
                                              
3 Income attributed to capital is essentially what is left over from revenue after paying for 
intermediate goods and services and all labour costs.  
4 Another important issue that accounts for differences in estimates is industry coverage. Broad 
economy-wide estimates include owner-occupied housing, which only has a capital income 
component, and the government sector, for which capital income is taken not to accrue. With 
reliance on market sector estimates in later chapters, these issues do not arise in this paper. 
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The common starting point to allocating proprietors’ income is to impute a labour 
income component based on hours worked and the average employee wage in the 
same industry.5 
Since payments to labour and capital exhaust available income, the labour income 
share and the capital income share sum to 100 in percentage terms. Obviously, a fall 
in the labour income share means a rise of the same size in the capital income share. 
This simple division of gross income between labour and capital means that 
important allocations of income from production are overlooked, including those to: 
• governments through various taxes and charges 
• depreciation to cover replacement of the nation’s capital stock and its income-
earning potential 
• foreigners, through their part ownership of the capital stock and through direct 
labour participation. 
3.2 Trends in the labour income share 
Trends in the labour income share (LIS) in Australia and other countries are now 
briefly reviewed. The review is intended to provide context, rather than detailed 
treatment of trends and causes.6 
Historical 
Labour and capital income shares, or the functional distribution of income, were of 
keen interest to the classical economists of the 18th and 19th centuries and later to 
others such as the neoclassical, Marxian and post-Keynesian schools. But interest 
waned as evidence of the constancy of the labour and capital income shares came to 
light and Kaldor (1957) famously declared the constancy to be a stylised fact.7 The 
  
                                              
5 For details and comparisons of imputation methods for Australian estimates see, for example, 
ACTU (2013), appendix A. 
6 EC (2007) and Bertoli and Ferina (2007) provide reviews of contemporary issues and literature. 
7 The constancy of the factor income shares is also known as Bowley’s Law, after a British 
statistician who drew attention to it in the 1920s (see for example, Schnieder 2011). 
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 conventional wisdom became that upward movements in capital-labour ratios were 
offset by movements in the ratio of wage and profit rates, leaving the LIS constant.8 
There was, nevertheless, scope for short-term variability in response to the business 
cycle or temporary shocks. The labour income share is considered to be counter-
cyclical (EC 2007). It rises in the down phase of the cycle, for example, as 
businesses hoard labour and profits fall, while nominal wages remain ‘sticky’. 
International 
Interest in the LIS was rekindled with evidence of medium- to long-term 
movements in the post-WWII era. The evidence challenged earlier assumptions 
about the behaviour of income shares or, at least, the time periods over which 
correcting responses occurred. 
As a general pattern across developed nations, the LIS rose in the late 1960s and 
1970s, and then declined gradually over the 1980s and 1990s (EC 2007; Rodriguez 
and Jayadev 2010; Karabarbounis and Neiman 2012). This was clearly evident, for 
example, in most European countries (and Japan), where the LIS rose to a peak in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, and then steadily declined (EC 2007). It was mildly 
evident in the US (see below). 
The general view is that the rises were associated with a combination of wage 
increases due to institutional arrangements that increased the bargaining power of 
labour, economic shocks (oil prices) and a slowdown in productivity growth 
(Bertoli and Farina 2007).  
The extent of the decline varied across countries, due in part to differences in the 
extent to which labour income shares had risen from their pre-1960s levels. The 
declines in Europe and Japan, for example, were much greater than the decline in 
the US. 
Various reasons for the decline in labour shares have been put forward. They 
include capital deepening (increases in the capital-labour ratio) as businesses 
substituted capital for more-expensive labour, technological advance that increased 
profits and augmented capital and substituted against labour, shifts in industry 
composition away from labour-intensive toward capital-intensive industries, more 
                                              
8 This happens if the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour has a value of one (and 
factors are paid in line with their marginal products). The constancy of labour and capital 
income shares has been taken as support for the validity of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function and its implied unitary elasticity of substitution between labour and capital. While 
estimates of this elasticity vary, more recent estimates suggest that it could be well above 1 
(Karabarbounis and Neiman 2013). 
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competitive markets that reduced those economic rents captured by labour, 
increased globalisation that increased the global supply of cheap labour, and 
institutional developments that have reduced labour bargaining power (EC 2007; 
Bertoli and Farina 2007; OECD 2012; Sweeney 2013). Of these, technological 
advance may be the most important over the broad sweep of the decline (Bassanini 
and Manfredi 2012). 
Interest in the labour income share has intensified in recent years as part of more 
general concerns about a more unequal distribution of income in advanced 
economies. The concerns arise not only from an equity point of view, but also about 
macro stability (demand patterns and tax revenues) and even social cohesion (EC 
2007; OECD 2011, 2012). 
United States 
The US is a prominent case in point. The US labour income share had been very 
stable, especially in comparison with other countries (EC 2007). But it has fallen 
sharply in the 2000s.  
Figure 3.2 shows the commonly-referenced data for the US non-farm business 
sector.9 Some downward trend is evident in the 1980s and 1990s, but there was a 
recovery towards the end of the 1990s. According to these commonly-used 
estimates, the LIS has dropped more than 5 percentage points since 2000 and is 
now, by far, below its previous low point during WWII (Fleck, Glaser and Sprague 
2011). There is some dispute, however, about the depth of the fall and how ‘out of 
normal bounds’ it is (Gomme and Rupert 2004, Rupert 2012). On the other hand, 
the fact that the share should fall so far in the midst of a deep recession is 
unusual.10  
This sharp fall has received a lot of attention (for example, Jacobson and Occhino 
2012; CEA 2013). It is one element of concern in the US about a shift in the 
distribution of personal and household income toward high-income earners. The fall 
is seen as contributing to a more unequal distribution because capital income is 
distributed more unevenly than employment income (CBO 2011). The fall has also 
raised concern about the sustainability of government revenues, since capital 
income is taxed at a lower rate (CEA 2013). 
  
                                              
9 Of passing interest, figure 3.2 also shows the short-term variations that tend to be associated 
with the business cycle.  
10 As noted above, the labour share usually behaves in a counter-cyclical fashion. According to 
figure 3.2, the late-2000s recession only brought a temporary stay in the fall. 
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The fall in the US labour share sits alongside related evidence of: 
• a ‘decoupling’ of the real purchasing power of wages from productivity growth, 
according to which the typical worker has not received any gains from 
productivity growth (Sharpe et al. 2008; Michel and Gee 2012) 
• a concentration of earnings growth among high-income earners (CBO 2011; 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2012) 
• a ‘hollowing out’ of the middle class through loss of job opportunities for 
middle-income and middle-skill workers, while opportunities have grown in 
low-pay jobs (Autor, Katz and Kearney 2008) 
• an increase in unemployment and decline in participation in the wake of the 
global financial crisis. 
The concerns have undoubtedly come to the fore in the wake of the global financial 
crisis and the perception that the burden of stagnation and contraction has been 
borne disproportionately by low- and middle-income earners, while the top-income 
earners have continued to prosper.  
Notwithstanding recent developments, the sharp drop since 2000 has stirred 
considerable international interest in the US case from the point of view that it may 
indicate what may be in store for other countries (Sweeney 2013). 
Australia 
An LIS series for Australia’s market sector is shown in figure 3.3. The currently 
available series commences in 1973-74.11  
There is other evidence to suggest that the rise in the labour share from around 
1973-74 to the late 1980s was similar to the ‘hump shape’ evident in other 
countries. That is, the share was stable for some years prior to 1973-74 (see Parham 
et al. 200012 and the wage shares in figures 3.1 and 3.4). It then rose before falling 
to the longer run level at the end of the 1980s. 
  
                                              
11 Of passing note, Australia’s labour income share appears to be lower than the US share and has 
shown wider medium- to long-term variation. This pattern is confirmed in other sources that use 
comparable data. The difference in levels could be due in part to different industry mixes in the 
two economies. 
12 Estimates in Parham et al. (2000) commence in 1964-65 and show little change in the labour 
income share until around 1973-74. 
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Figure 3.2 Labour income share in the US non-farm business sectora 
per cent 
 
a Arrows indicate timing (and duration) of recessions as designated by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Data source: Fleck, Glaser and Sprague (2011). 
Figure 3.3 The labour income share in Australia’s market sectora 
per cent 
 
a 12-industry market sector. 
Data source: ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0.55.002). 
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As discussed in Parham et al. (2000) and ACTU (2013), Australia had: 
• a strong increase in the labour share in the early 1970s (which was sustained 
until the early 1980s)13 
– this was associated with a wages ‘push’ and the ‘real wage overhang’ 
• a decline in the labour share through the 1980s (back to around pre-1970s levels) 
– this was engineered through the Prices and Incomes Accords, which traded 
benefits outside of labour remuneration (increases in the so-called ‘social 
wage’) for restraint in nominal wage growth and this helped to bring 
reductions in real wage costs 
• relative stability in the LIS through the productivity decade of the 1990s. 
The medium- to long-term movements in Australia’s LIS over the second half of the 
20th century were large by international standards (figure 3.4). 
Figure 3.4 Wage share in selected countriesa 
per cent 
 
a Compensation per employee in proportion to GDP per person. 
Data source: EU AMECO database. 
  
                                              
13 The recession around 1982-83 may also have propped up the labour share. 
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The labour share has fallen sharply in Australia in the 2000s. The exact size of the 
fall depends on which estimates are used. ABS data, relied on here in later chapters, 
suggests a fall of 4 percentage points. The ACTU (2013) used an alternative 
estimation method that generates a fall of 5.8 percentage points. According to 
OECD data, as presented in ACTU (2013), the fall in Australia (4.8 percentage 
points) was larger than in the US (4.0 percentage points).  
Causes of change in the labour share of income 
As previously noted, a variety of research studies, analyses and commentaries have 
attributed the changes in the distribution of market incomes in advanced economies 
to a number of causes. The OECD (2011, 2012), in reviewing the evidence, 
emphasised: 
• skill-biased technological change 
– in particular, more intensive use of information and communications 
technologies is seen to substitute for low-skill jobs but to complement high-
skill jobs 
• increased globalisation 
– the internationalisation of production has effectively increased the supply of 
low- and middle-skill workers, which has reduced job opportunities and 
wages for these types of workers in high-income countries. 
While these trends contribute to higher growth in total income, they tend to increase 
the dispersion of personal incomes. In addressing possible policy responses to the 
greater dispersion, the OECD noted that slowing down technological change and 
globalisation is not a sensible option, because these factors are important in 
determining the amount of income there is to share.14 It put forward further 
investment in human capital as its favoured remedial approach. 
3.3 An Australia–US comparison 
A key question is whether the fall in Australia’s labour income share is part of the 
international trend and, more specifically, a reflection of the same developments 
that appear to be at work in the US economy. 
                                              
14 Recent research paper by Commission staff found that while there has been in increased 
dispersion of hourly wages and individual market incomes in Australia, all income deciles had 
experienced significant income growth over the last decade (Greenville, Pobke and Rogers 
2013). 
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A comparison of selected economic conditions and developments in the Australian 
and US economies helps to address this question. 
Average income growth 
The US did not share Australia’s continued growth in prosperity in the 2000s. 
While growth in real average income was very similar in the two countries over the 
1990s, US growth drifted well behind Australian growth in the 2000s (figure 3.5). 
While growth in Australia’s average income accelerated (chapter 2), growth in US 
average income fell from a rate of 2.1 per cent a year in the 1990s to 0.6 per cent a 
year over the decade of the 2000s. 
Figure 3.5 Growth in real average income in Australia and the US since 
1990a 
per cent 
 
a GDI per person in Australia. GDP per person in the US. The terms of trade contribution to real income 
growth does not matter for the US. Trade represents only a small proportion of the US economy and, besides, 
the US terms of trade fell in the 2000s. 
Data sources: US Bureau of Economic Analysis; ABS. 
The distributional changes over the 2000s were therefore taking place in quite 
different contexts. It was the distribution of pain versus plenty. In the US, it was 
essentially sharing the burden of slow growth and contraction. In Australia, it was 
essentially sharing the bounty from continued expansion.  
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Growth in labour and capital income 
This distinction comes into sharp relief when trends in labour and capital income 
are compared.  
Deceleration versus acceleration in labour and capital incomes 
The labour income shares fell in the two economies for quite different reasons. 
There was a fall in growth in labour income in the US, but not in Australia. 
In the US, the rate of growth in both capital income and labour income fell in the 
2000s, compared with the 1990s (figure 3.6). The labour income share fell because 
labour income decelerated more than capital income did. 
Figure 3.6 Growth in labour and capital income in Australia and the US in 
the 1990s and 2000sa 
annual average rate of growth (per cent) 
Australia  US 
  
a Labour income is compensation of employees. Capital income is the residual (excluding ownership of 
dwellings). Both are measured in current prices.  
Data sources: US Bureau of Economic Analysis; ABS . 
In Australia, the rate of growth in both labour and capital income picked up in the 
2000s. The labour income share fell, not because there was slower growth in labour 
income, but because the acceleration in labour income was overshadowed by the 
acceleration in capital income. 
Industry sources 
The industry sources of change in output and income growth were also very 
different.  
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In the US, a much weaker manufacturing contribution was the major industry 
source of the 2000s slowdown (figure 3.7). The Council of Economic Advisors 
(CEA 2013) reported that about half the decline in the US labour share since 2000 is 
attributable to Manufacturing.  
In contrast, Mining and Construction were the main sources of more-rapid 
expansion in the Australian economy (figure 3.7).15 There was only a minor 
contraction in the Manufacturing contribution to growth in Australia. At face value, 
the mining boom and its associated construction activity are the most likely source 
of changes in income patterns in Australia. The following chapters investigate the 
industry sources. 
Figure 3.7 Industry contributions to income growth in Australia and the 
USa 
percentage points 
Australia US 
  
a Contributions to non-dwelling current price GDP. 
Data sources: US Bureau of Economic Analysis; ABS. 
  
                                              
15 This was shown for the market sector in chapter 2, but is also true for the economy in general as 
shown here. 
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3.4 Key point summary 
• The labour income share is the proportion of income generated from production 
that is allocated to labour in wages and associated on-costs.  
• The perception that the labour income share remains constant can be challenged 
on the evidence. 
– In many countries, there was a ‘hump shaped’ pattern in the second half of 
the 20th century. The labour income share rose in the 1960s and 1970s and 
returned to longer run levels in the 1980s and 1990s. 
– There have been further falls in a number of countries in the 2000s. 
• Technological advances and increased globalisation are considered to be major 
factors behind the general decline in the labour income share in advanced 
economies. 
• The US has taken a somewhat unusual path. 
– Its labour share followed the hump shape pattern to a mild degree in the 
second half of the 20th century, but was essentially stable, especially in 
comparison to other countries. 
– Its share has fallen sharply in the 2000s.  
 The fall is widely regarded as unprecedented. 
 It is one of a number of developments that have raised concern about 
growing disparities in the distribution of income and their broader 
economic and social impacts. 
 The US case has stirred international interest from the point of view that it 
might herald trends for other countries. 
• Australia has shown considerable variation in its labour share from an 
international perspective. 
– It followed the hump shape in the second half of the 20th century, with a 
relatively large upswing in the 1970s and reversion in the 1980s. 
– The share was stable through the 1990s. 
– It fell sharply in the 2000s — at least as sharply as in the US. 
 This raises the question of whether the same factors are at work in 
Australia as in the US. 
• A comparison of economic developments in the US and Australia strongly 
suggests that the labour share has fallen in the two countries for quite different 
reasons. 
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– It has been a case of the distribution of pain in the US versus the distribution 
of plenty in Australia. 
– The labour income share fell in the US because growth in labour income 
decelerated more than capital income. The labour share fell in Australia 
because growth in labour income accelerated less than capital income. 
 Growth in labour income slowed in the US, but not in Australia. 
– The income developments had different industry sources. The decline of 
Manufacturing was at the heart of the slower growth in income in the US and 
the shift in income away from labour. The mining boom, manifest in the 
Mining and Construction industries, was the main source of growth in 
income in Australia. 
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4 The labour share: aggregate 
perspective  
This chapter returns to Australia’s market sector and seeks further proximate 
explanations for the fall in the labour income share. 
The chapter takes the following course. 
• Section 4.1 reviews trends in the labour income share in the market sector over 
the 1990s and 2000s. 
• Section 4.2 reiterates the explanation for the fall in labour share in terms of a 
stronger acceleration in capital income than in labour income. 
• Sections 4.3 and 4.4 find explanations in terms of: 
– increased capital intensity 
– a gap between real wage growth and labour productivity growth. 
• Section 4.5 provides a summary.  
4.1 The labour income share in the market sector 
The labour income share (LIS) was generally flat over the course of the productivity 
decade, but fell markedly over the terms of trade decade. 
Income shares over the past two decades 
ABS estimates of the LIS in the market sector of the economy are used to examine 
trends. The market sector is used for three reasons. 
First, the ABS only apportions the income of proprietors (who provide a 
combination of capital and labour services) into a capital component and a labour 
component for the market sector.  
Second, use of the market sector avoids complications that arise from the inclusion 
of ownership of dwellings (capital income only) and industries in the government 
sector (no return on capital). 
   
52 LABOUR'S SHARE OF 
GROWTH IN INCOME 
AND PROSPERITY 
 
 
Third, the use of market sector data on the LIS allows the analysis to be integrated 
with productivity estimates that are better-formed with respect to the market sector.  
Data for the 12-industry market sector (MS12) are used in the rest of this paper, 
because they encompass all of the 1990s, as well as the 2000s. The data for the 
16-industry market sector (MS16) do not span the 1990s.  
The 1990s 
Australia’s labour income share changed little overall in the productivity decade of 
the 1990s. Although there was a rise in the early part of the decade, its significance 
can be heavily discounted as it was a temporary change associated with the 
recession at that time.1 The LIS declined by 2 percentage points between 1989-90 
and 1999-00, on the raw data (figure 4.1). In another long-term ABS series, in 
which some of the year-to-year volatility has been removed, the LIS did not change 
over the decade.2 The ACTU (2013) study shows and notes no overall change in the 
LIS over the 1990s. 
The 2000s 
The LIS clearly fell more sharply, however, over the terms of trade decade. It fell 
by 4 percentage points in both the 12-industry and 16-industry market sectors3 
between 1999-00 and 2009-10 (figure 4.1). The LIS fell further, but recovered, over 
the following two years. 
By way of comparison, the ACTU (2013) study reports a fall in the LIS of 5.8 
percentage points between 1999-00 and 2011-12. The ACTU paper canvasses a 
range of methods which provide results that are different in degree, but all show 
there has been a large fall in the LIS over the 2000s. The 4 percentage points gap 
presented here, based on ABS market sector data, would appear to be at the low end 
of the range of estimates. 
                                              
1 The LIS tends to rise in recessions, as businesses hoard labour and wages are ‘sticky’ or limited 
in their downward movements, while profits fall (chapter 3). 
2 The ABS publishes two LIS series for the 12-industry market sector: one from 1989-90 and 
another from 1973-74, which contains two-period averages. The latter is presented in figure 3.3 
in the previous chapter. 
3 See box 2.1 in chapter 2 for the industry composition of the two market sectors. 
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Figure 4.1 Labour income share in Australia’s 12-industry market sector 
(MS12) and 16-industry market sector (MS16) 
per cent 
 
a The coverage of the 12-industry and 16-industry market sector is outlined in box 2.1. 
Data source: ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0.55.002). 
4.2 Relative growth in capital and labour income 
The previous chapter noted that economy-wide capital income grew faster than 
labour income in the 2000s. This was also true for the market sector.  
Growth in capital income exceeded growth in labour income 
The fact that there was more growth in capital income than in labour income in the 
2000s meant that, by definition, the labour income share fell. Figure 4.2, which 
shows in the right panel that capital income more than doubled between 1999-00 
and 2009-10, whereas labour income grew 80 per cent. In terms of annual average 
rates, capital income grew 1.6 percentage points faster than labour income 
(table 4.1). 
There was no reduction in growth in labour income 
As suggested in the previous chapter, and unlike what happened in the US, the 
labour income share did not fall as a result of a slowdown in growth in labour 
income. In fact, as figure 4.2 shows, nominal labour income grew more in the 2000s 
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decade (80 per cent) than it did in the 1990s (55 per cent). The annual average rate 
of growth was 1.5 percentage points faster in the 2000s decade (table 4.1). 
Figure 4.2 Cumulative growth in labour and capital income and the labour 
income share in the 1990s and the 2000s 
per cent 
1990s 2000s 
  
Data source: ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0.55.002).  
Table 4.1 Growth in labour, capital and total income, 1990s and 2000s  
per cent per year  
  
1989-90 to 1999-00 
 
1999-00 to 2009-10 
Percentage point 
change 
Total income 4.5 6.6 2.0 
Labour income 4.3 5.8 1.5 
Capital income 4.9 7.5 2.6 
Difference (cap - lab) 0.6 1.6 1.1 
Source: Author’s estimates based on ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0.55.002). 
There was a stronger acceleration in capital income 
Capital income growth exceeded labour income growth in the 2000s because capital 
income accelerated more than labour income, from their growth rates of the 1990s. 
The growth rates of capital and labour were similar in the 1990s, with capital 
income growing around 60 per cent or at a rate of 4.9 per cent a year. In the 2000s, 
capital income grew an additional 50 percentage points or at 7.5 per cent annual 
average rate. The 2.6 percentage points acceleration in the rate of capital income 
growth rate compares with the 1.5 percentage points acceleration in the labour 
income rate. 
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4.3 Factor proportions and relative rewards 
The stronger growth and acceleration in capital income, relative to labour income, 
could be due to one or a combination of:  
• a quantity effect 
– the quantity of capital used increases relative to the use of labour 
– this would be a ‘factor proportions’ contribution; 
• a price effect 
– the rate of payment of income to capital increases, relative to the rate of 
payment to labour 
– this would be a ‘relative rewards’ contribution. 
The objective in this section is to discover whether the quantity or price effect 
dominated in the 2000s. 
In the assessment that follows, the capital-labour ratio (K/L) is defined in terms of 
capital services delivered (K) and hours of work provided (L). The reward ratio 
(w/r) is formed from labour income divided by hours worked and capital income 
divided by the productive capital stock. The wage rate is therefore the average 
hourly cost of labour (w). The gross rate of return (r) is the average gross return on 
capital, before tax, depreciation and interest.4 
Factor proportions, reward ratios and the labour income share 
The capital-labour ratio tends to increase over time. For the LIS to remain constant 
in these circumstances, growth in the reward ratio (wage rate to rate of return) has 
to match growth in the capital-labour ratio. A fall in the LIS means that growth in 
factor proportions exceeds growth in the reward ratio (box 4.1). 
                                              
4 Data from the ABS productivity accounts are used to generate the estimates in this section. 
Consequently, capital is measured as a capital services index and the gross profit rate is 
measured as an index of capital income per unit of capital service (and since capital services are 
proportional to the productive capital stock this index is also an index of the gross rate of return 
on the productive capital stock). While this does not conform to the normal concept of a gross 
rate of profit, a very similar pattern of divergence between the capital-labour ratio and the wage 
to gross profit ratio (as shown in figure 4.3) emerges if capital is measured as net capital stock.  
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Box 4.1 Changes in the LIS and quantity and price contributions 
One way to capture the relationship between changes in the labour income share (LIS) 
and quantity and price effects is to express the ratio of the LIS and the capital income 
share (KIS) in terms of their quantity and price components.  
 
𝐿𝐼𝑆
𝐾𝐼𝑆
= 𝐿.𝑤
𝐾.𝑟 . 𝑌𝑌 = 𝐿𝐾 . 𝑤𝑟  
where K is capital services, L is hours worked, w is the nominal average hourly wage 
rate, r is the rate of return on capital and Y is nominal output. 
To put this relationship in growth rate terms: 
 𝐿𝐼𝑆� − 𝐾𝐼𝑆� = �𝑤
𝑟
�
�
− �
𝐾
𝐿
�
�  
where the hat symbol ‘^’ over a variable refers to a growth rate in that variable. 
If the LIS remains constant, so does the KIS (because KIS = 1- LIS). In this case the 
left hand side equals zero and the condition for that result is that growth in the capital 
labour ratio is equal to the growth in the reward ratio.  
A decrease in the LIS will mean that the left hand side is negative and growth in the 
capital-labour ratio is greater than growth in the reward ratio. However, the size of the 
gap between growth in the price and quantity ratios does not indicate the extent of the 
decline in the LIS.  
 
The 1990s experience provides an illustration, albeit an inexact one. The labour 
income share was mostly flat and, as figure 4.3 (left panel) shows, growth in the 
capital-labour ratio and the reward ratio were fairly closely aligned over the 
decade.5  
The 2000s, when the LIS fell more markedly, were different. As the right-hand 
panel of figure 4.3 shows, the capital-labour ratio grew much more (53 per cent) 
than the wage-return ratio (32 per cent). 
However, the growth in the quantity and price ratios should be treated as orders of 
magnitude, rather than as precise estimates. As will be discussed in chapter 6, there 
is some uncertainty about the accuracy of the capital and rate of return estimates. 
                                              
5 Again, there was a temporary aberration in the early 1990s associated with the recession, when 
profit rates declined relative to wage rates. 
   
 THE LABOUR SHARE: 
AGGREGATE 
PERSPECTIVE 
57 
 
Figure 4.3 Cumulative annual growth in factor proportions and reward 
ratios and the labour income share, 1990s and 2000sa 
per cent 
1990s 2000s 
  
a 1989-90 to 1999-00 and 1999-00 to 2009-10. 
Data source: Author’s estimates based on ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0.55.002). 
The quantity effect dominated 
If the 1990s are taken as a benchmark in which ‘typical’ growth in the capital-
labour ratio is approximately offset by ‘typical’ growth in the reward ratio6, the fall 
in the LIS in the 2000s can be attributed predominantly to an increased quantity 
effect. Factor proportions grew much more in the 2000s (70 per cent) than they did 
in the 1990s (34 per cent), whereas growth in the reward ratio was similar (32 and 
26 per cent respectively). (See figure 4.3.) 
Table 4.2 provides the comparisons in growth rates. The average annual rate of 
growth in the capital-labour ratio accelerated by 1 percentage point between the 
decades, whereas the rate of growth in the reward ratio remained stable. 
The quantity effect was the result of an investment boom 
The faster growth in the capital-labour ratio in the 2000s was due to more rapid 
growth in capital (table 4.2). While growth in hours worked picked up in the 2000s 
(a 0.5 percentage points faster rate), the 2000s investment boom lifted the rate of 
growth in the capital stock by even more (1.5 percentage points faster). Capital 
                                              
6 There are no equivalent data to determine long-term trends. 
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input growth was a very rapid 5.0 per cent a year on average over the first decade of 
the 2000s.  
Increased growth in wages and profits largely offset each other 
The rate of growth in wages and profits both lifted in the 1990s, but to about the 
same extent. Growth in nominal wage rates rose 1 percentage point and growth in 
rates of return rose 1.1 percentage points (table 4.2). And so, the growth in the 
reward ratio was approximately the same over the two decades. 
Table 4.2 Rate of growth in factor proportions, reward ratios and their 
componentsa 
per cent per year 
  
1989-90 to 1999-90 
 
1999-00 to 2009-10 
Percentage 
point change 
Capital [K] 3.5 5.0 1.5 
Labour [L] 0.5 1.1 0.5 
K/L 2.9 3.9 1.0 
Wage rate [w] 3.8 4.8 1.0 
Profit rate [r] 1.4 2.5 1.1 
w/r 2.4 2.3 -0.1 
𝐿𝐼𝑆� − 𝐾𝐼𝑆�  -0.6 -1.6 -1.0 
a See box 4.1 for derivation of relationships. 
Source: Author’s estimates , based on ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0.55.002). 
Labour and capital had stronger growth in both quantity and price terms in the 
2000s 
All labour and capital quantities and prices grew more rapidly in the 2000s 
(figure 4.4). On the labour side, the hours worked growth rate picked up from 0.5 to 
1.1 per cent a year, and the rate of wages growth picked up from 3.8 to 4.8 per cent 
a year.  
The growth in capital and labour inputs over the 2000s was strong by historical 
standards. The average rate of growth in hours worked of 1.1 per cent a year 
compares with a long-term average of 0.8 per cent a year.7 The average rate of 
growth in capital services of 5.0 per cent a year compares with a long-term average 
of 4.2 per cent a year. 
                                              
7 The long-term averages provided in ABS data are from 1973-74 to 2007-08. 
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Similar data on long-term average rates of growth in wages and rates of return are 
not available. 
Figure 4.4 Growth in factor proportions, reward ratios and their 
components 
per cent per year 
 
  
Data source: Author’s estimates based on ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0.55.002). 
4.4 Productivity and costs 
The fall in the labour income share can be viewed in yet another way. The LIS is 
equivalent to the real unit cost of labour, which is the real cost of an hour of labour 
(the real wage) divided by the real product of an hour of labour (labour 
productivity). Box 4.2 demonstrates the equivalence between the LIS and real unit 
labour costs (RULC).  
The real wage concept used in this context warrants explanation. Growth in real 
wages here is the change in the real cost of labour to producers. The nominal wage 
rate is the hourly cost of labour (all forms of compensation, including on-costs). The 
real cost of labour is measured with reference to movements in the prices of the 
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goods and services for which the labour is engaged to produce. That is, movements 
in product prices are used to convert nominal wage costs into real wage costs. A 
real wage increase means the nominal cost of an hour of labour has risen faster than 
product prices. 
This real wage is referred to as ‘the real product wage’ (RPW). As will be seen in 
chapter 7, it is important to distinguish between a real wage based on the prices of 
goods and services produced and a real wage based on the prices of goods and 
services consumed. 
 
Box 4.2 The labour income share, growth in real wages and labour 
productivity and real unit labour costs 
The labour income share is mathematically equivalent to the real unit cost of labour. 
Real unit labour costs (RULC) are the real costs of labour (𝐿𝐶𝑟) divided by the 
number of units of output (𝑌𝑟): 
 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐶 = 𝐿𝐶𝑟
𝑌𝑟
  (1) 
The labour income share (LIS) is the nominal cost of labour (𝐿𝐶𝑛) divided by the 
nominal amount of income (𝑌𝑛):  
 𝐿𝐼𝑆 = 𝐿𝐶𝑛
𝑌𝑛
 
  = 𝐿𝐶𝑛
𝑌𝑛
. 𝑃𝑌
𝑃𝑌
= 𝐿𝐶𝑟
𝑌𝑟
= 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐶 
Real unit labour costs can be defined in terms of the real product wage (RPW) and 
labour productivity (LP). Multiplying and dividing (1) by the number of hours worked: 
 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐶 = 𝐿𝐶𝑟
𝐻
. 𝐻
𝑌𝑟
 
   = 𝑅𝑃𝑊
𝐿𝑃
 (2) 
Equation (2) can be expressed in growth rate terms, where a hat ‘^’ over a variable 
signifies a growth rate in that variable: 
       𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐶 =� 𝑅𝑃𝑊� −𝐿𝑃�   �= 𝐿𝐼𝑆� � (3) 
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Labour productivity and wages 
According to the decomposition in box 4.2, a decline in the LIS means there is a 
decline in RULC, which in turn means that growth in real wage rates does not keep 
pace with growth in labour productivity (LP). The evidence from the 2000s (figure 
4.5) bears this out. 
Real wage growth did not keep pace with productivity growth in the 2000s 
The real product wage moved mostly in line with LP growth during the productivity 
decade of the 1990s.8 There was little change in both RULC and the LIS (left panel 
of figure 4.5). 
Figure 4.5 Cumulative growth in the real product wage (RPW), labour 
productivity (LP) and real unit labour costs (RULC) and the level 
of the labour income share (LIS),1990s and 2000s 
index, 1999-00=100 (left hand side) and per cent (right hand side) 
1990s 2000s 
  
Source: Author’s estimates based on ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0.55.002). 
However, growth in the RPW was about 9 percentage points below LP  growth over 
the first decade of the 2000s (right panel of figure 4.5). In keeping with the growth 
gap, RULC declined by 9 per cent.9 
In terms of annual average rates, growth in the real product wage was 0.7 of a 
percentage point behind LP growth in the 2000s (table 4.3). 
                                              
8 Again the aberration associated with the early 1990s recession is evident. 
9 A decline in LIS from 57 to 53 per cent is a 7 per cent decline. The difference between 7 per 
cent and the 9 per cent decline in RULC is likely to be due to ‘rounding’, since the LIS is 
expressed only in terms of integers and not with decimal place precision. 
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Growth in real wages slowed even more than productivity growth 
It is well known that productivity growth slowed from the record highs achieved in 
the 1990s. A slowdown is reflected in the 0.8 of a percentage point slower decadal 
rate of growth in LP presented here (table 4.3). 
However, the slowdown in real wage growth was even larger (figure 4.5). Annual 
average RPW growth was 1.2 percentage points slower in the 2000s than in the 
1990s (table 4.3).  
 Table 4.3 Decomposition of growth in real unit labour costs into growth 
in the real product wage and growth in labour productivity 
per cent per year 
 
1990s 2000s Percentage point change 
Real product wage (RPW) 2.7 1.4 -1.2 
 – nominal wages 3.8 4.8 1.0 
 – output prices 1.1 3.4 2.3 
Labour productivity (LP) 2.9 2.1 -0.8 
 – real output 3.4 3.2 -0.2 
  – hours worked 0.5 1.1 0.5 
Real unit labour cost (RULC) -0.2 -0.7 -0.5 
Source: Author’s estimates based on ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0.55.002). 
The slowdown in real wage growth was mainly due to faster output price inflation 
Table 4.3 also provides a decomposition of the growth in the RPW into its nominal 
wage and product price components. Here, product prices refer to goods and 
services produced in the market sector10. Growth in RPW is, of course, equal to 
growth in the nominal wage less the rate of inflation in product prices. 
The much stronger inflation in product prices was the main reason for the slower 
RPW growth in the 2000s. As noted before, nominal wages grew at a healthy 
4.8 per cent a year, or 1 percentage point a year faster than in the 1990s. But a 2.3 
percentage point acceleration in the rate of product price inflation more than offset 
the acceleration in nominal wage growth. And so, the rate of RPW growth fell.  
The full decomposition of RULC growth for the 2000s is presented visually in 
figure 4.6.  
                                              
10 Output prices are measured as implicit prices for value added — that is, the ratio of 
current-price value added to the volume of value added. 
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Figure 4.6 Decomposition of 2000sa growth in RULC into elements of 
productivity and costs 
per cent per year 
 
a 1999-00 to 2009-10. 
Data source: Author’s estimates based on ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0.55.002). 
4.5 Key point summary 
• The labour income share in the market sector of the economy was stable over the 
1990s, but fell 4 percentage points over the 2000s. 
– This is at the low end of a range of estimates of the fall. 
• The LIS fell in the 2000s because there was stronger growth in capital income 
than in labour income. 
– Capital income more than doubled over the decade, whereas labour income 
increased by 80 per cent. 
• But there was more growth in labour income in the 2000s (80 per cent) than in 
the 1990s (55 per cent). 
• The fall in the LIS was predominantly associated with an increased quantity 
effect. 
– Compared with the 1990s, there was much stronger growth in the 
capital-labour ratio. 
 Capital and labour both grew more rapidly in the 2000s.  
 But the investment boom meant that growth in the capital stock picked up 
more than did growth in the use of labour. 
– The reward ratio grew at about the same rate as it did in the 1990s. 
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 There was also stronger growth in both the wage rate and the rate of 
return in the 2000s. 
 But they accelerated from the 1990s to about the same degree. 
• The fall in the LIS is equivalent to a fall in real unit labour costs. 
– This means that growth in the real product wage does not keep pace with 
growth in LP. 
– The slowdown in growth in the real product wage in the 2000s was even 
greater than the slowdown in productivity growth. 
 This was due to more rapid inflation in product prices in the 2000s. 
 The growth in nominal wages was stronger in the 2000s than in the 1990s. 
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5 The contribution of changes in industry 
structure  
Chapter 2 pointed to the mining boom as being the main source of additional income 
growth in the 2000s. The financial sector continued to be important, but the mining and 
construction sectors together accounted for two-thirds of the additional growth in 
income, relative to the 1990s. At the same time, the relative importance of the 
manufacturing sector as a source of output and income declined. 
Chapters 3 and 4 noted that the labour income share (LIS) declined in the 2000s 
because there was more growth in capital income than in labour income. Chapter 4 
went on to attribute the divergence between capital and labour income growth primarily 
to a quantity effect — that is, to an increase in capital intensity. That chapter also 
explained the fall in the labour share as a failure of growth in the real product wage to 
keep pace with growth in labour productivity, primarily because of much stronger 
product price inflation. 
This and the next chapter explore the role that structural change has played in the 
decline in the labour share. Whether industries associated with the mining boom — or 
other industries or other factors — played a key role is of particular interest. This 
chapter looks at changes in the structure of industries and the industry structure of 
labour and capital income. Industry contributions to the ‘quantity versus price’ and 
‘productivity and costs’ explanations are considered in the next chapter. 
The importance of the mining boom and structural change is not as obvious as it might 
at first seem. The ACTU (2013) study concluded that structural change only played a 
small part. It attributed the fall in the labour share primarily to widespread shifts in 
income away from labour within individual industries. 
To some extent, there is a methodological issue tied up in this conclusion. The vehicle 
typically used to compare structural change and within-industry effects — shift-share 
analysis — has some limitations in this context of factor income shares. An alternative 
method is put forward that leads to a different conclusion — one in which the mining 
boom essentially explains all of the change in LIS. 
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In this chapter: 
• section 5.1 outlines the changes in the industry structure of activity and changes in 
industry structure of factor incomes that took place in the 2000s 
• section 5.2 reports the relative contributions of changes in industry mix and changes 
within industries in explaining the fall in the labour income share, using shift-share 
analysis  
• section 5.3 identifies the industries that contributed to the disparity in growth in 
factor incomes at the market sector level. 
Section 5.4 provides an assessment of the role of structural change and the mining 
boom and section 5.5 provides the key point summary.  
5.1 Industry sources of factor income growth 
Chapter 2 identified the large and rapid redistributions of output and incomes across 
industries that took place in the 2000s.  
As will now be shown, those redistributions also brought large and rapid changes in the 
distributions of factor incomes. 
Labour income 
Labour income within industries grew in a range of 1 per cent a year (Agriculture) to 
10.4 per cent a year (Mining), around a market sector average of 5.8 per cent a year 
(table 5.1). 
Even with 10.4 per cent a year growth, Mining remained a relatively small source of 
labour income in the market sector. It accounted for less than 5 per cent of labour 
income in 2009-10 (table 5.1). 
Construction’s 7.8 per cent a year growth made the industry the largest source of labour 
income in the market sector (over 15 per cent) by the end of the decade.  
Manufacturing lost the most share of market sector labour income. Because its growth 
was weak relative to other industries, its share fell 4 percentage points over the decade. 
In the process, Manufacturing lost its position as the prime source of labour income in 
the market sector. 
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Growth in labour income was also relatively strong in Financial and insurance services 
(Finance) and Electricity, gas, water and waste services (Utilities). Finance increased its 
share to third place, behind Construction and Manufacturing. 
Table 5.1 Growth in labour income by industry and industry shares in market 
sector labour income 
per cent per year  
 Growth rate  Industry shares 
 
1990s 2000s 
Percentage 
point change 
 
1999-00 2009-10 
Percentage point 
change 
Agriculture 4.0 1.0 -3.0  3.9 2.4 -1.5 
Mining 1.6 10.4 8.8  2.8 4.5 1.6 
Manufacturing 2.8 3.5 0.8  19.1 15.2 -4.0 
Utilities -2.2 7.1 9.4  2.2 2.5 0.3 
Construction 4.0 7.8 3.8  12.8 15.6 2.8 
Wholesale 4.9 5.4 0.4  9.2 8.8 -0.4 
Retail 5.9 5.0 -0.8  10.8 10.0 -0.9 
Accommodation 7.8 4.6 -3.2  5.9 5.2 -0.7 
Transport 3.8 6.1 2.4  8.4 8.6 0.3 
Telecoms 5.0 3.4 -1.6  4.2 3.3 -0.9 
Finance 6.6 7.9 1.3  11.7 14.5 2.7 
Arts & rec 4.8 6.5 1.7  8.9 9.5 0.6 
Market sector 12 4.3 5.8 1.5  100.0 100.0  
Source: Author’s estimates based on ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0550.02). 
Decadal change in growth 
It was noted in chapters 3 and 4 that growth in labour income in the 2000s was more 
rapid than in the 1990s. 
That was mostly also true at the industry level. The biggest uplift in growth was in the 
Utilities, followed by Mining (table 5.1). Construction’s growth in labour income was 
also quite a deal stronger in the 2000s. And growth also picked up, albeit to a relatively 
small degree, in Manufacturing.  
Growth was weaker in the second decade in Accommodation and food services 
(Accommodation), Agriculture, forestry and fishing (Agriculture), and Information 
media and telecommunications (Telecoms). 
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Capital income 
Capital income grew in the range of 2.7 per cent a year in Manufacturing to 12.7 per 
cent a year in Mining, around a market sector average of 7.5 per cent a year (table 5.2). 
Table 5.2 Growth in capital income by industry and industry shares in market 
sector capital income 
per cent per year  
 Growth rate  Industry shares 
 
1990s 2000s 
Change 
(pp) 
 
1999-00 2009-10 
Change 
(pp) 
Agriculture 0.3 4.7 4.5  6.5 4.9 -1.6 
Mining 5.1 12.7 7.6  12.3 20.7 8.4 
Manufacturing 3.6 2.7 -0.9  18.9 11.7 -7.2 
Utilities 2.9 5.4 2.5  6.4 5.2 -1.2 
Construction 4.0 9.8 5.8  6.5 8.1 1.7 
Wholesale 3.6 6.3 2.7  5.6 5.0 -0.6 
Retail 2.6 8.3 5.8  3.9 4.3 0.4 
Accommodation 5.4 9.2 3.7  1.9 2.2 0.3 
Transport 5.1 7.4 2.3  7.3 7.2 -0.1 
Telecoms 7.9 6.0 -1.9  8.6 7.4 -1.2 
Finance 11.5 8.3 -3.2  15.4 16.8 1.4 
Arts & rec 4.8 6.9 2.1  6.8 6.4 -0.4 
Market sector 12 4.9 7.5 2.6  100.0 100.0 
 Source: Author’s estimates based on ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0550.02). 
With such strong growth, Mining became the largest source of capital income by the 
end of the 2000s decade, accounting for one in five dollars of capital income in the 
market sector. 
Construction had the next strongest growth at nearly 10 per cent a year, which pushed 
its share of market sector capital income to 8.1 per cent at the end of the decade. 
However, Construction remained a more important source of market sector labour 
income (15.6 per cent). 
With the weakest growth, Manufacturing lost the biggest share. It had been the largest 
source of capital income in the market sector at the turn of the millennium, but its share 
fell 7.2 percentage points to 11.7 per cent, well behind Mining and Finance. 
Manufacturing lost more capital income share than labour income share. 
There was also relatively strong growth in Accommodation, Finance and Retail trade 
(Retail). Accommodation and Retail, however, are relatively small sources of capital 
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income. The financial sector remained the second largest source of capital income over 
the decade. 
Decadal change in growth 
An acceleration in capital income growth from 1990s rates was also widespread. The 
strongest uplift was, unsurprisingly, in Mining. Construction and Retail also had strong 
rises in growth rates.  
Growth slowed in Finance (from a high rate), Telecoms and Manufacturing. 
Industry labour income shares 
Since the incidence of stronger growth in capital income than in labour income was 
widespread at the industry level, the incidence of falls in the LIS was also widespread 
(table 5.3): 
• Mining and Construction had falls of 4 percentage points. 
• The largest falls were in Agriculture (-9 percentage points), Accommodation 
(-8 percentage points), Retail (-6 percentage points) and Telecoms (-6 percentage 
points). 
Table 5.3 Industry labour income shares 
percentage points 
 1989-90 1999-00 2009-10 2000s change 
Agriculture 36 45 36 -9 
Mining 31 24 20 -4 
Manufacturing 60 58 60 2 
Utilities 44 32 36 4 
Construction 73 73 69 -4 
Wholesale 66 69 67 -2 
Retail 73 79 73 -6 
Accommodation 77 81 73 -8 
Transport 64 61 58 -3 
Telecoms 47 40 34 -6 
Finance 63 51 50 -1 
Arts & rec 64 64 63 -1 
Market sector 12 59 57 53 -4 
Source: ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0550.02). 
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The LIS increased in two industries — the Utilities (4 percentage points) and 
Manufacturing (2 percentage points). The increase in Manufacturing is particularly 
noteworthy, as it suggests the relative decline of the industry was focused more on 
capital than on labour. 
5.2 Changes in relative size and changes within 
industries 
There were major reallocations of output and income among industries over the 2000s 
decade (section 2.3 in chapter 2). In particular, a large share of total income was 
redistributed from Manufacturing to Mining. Finance and Construction also received a 
higher proportion of income, while Agriculture received a lower proportion.  
Output and income reallocations affect the market sector LIS. A shift toward industries 
with low LISs and away from industries with high LISs will bring about a fall in the 
average (aggregate) LIS. The converse is also obviously true. 
The 2000s reallocations would have had mixed effects. Mining, being capital intensive, 
has a low LIS and Manufacturing has an LIS just above average (table 5.3). Those 
reallocations would have reduced the aggregate LIS. On the other hand, the shift toward 
the Construction industry, which has a high LIS, would have increased the market 
sector LIS. 
The widespread falls in LIS within industries would have worked to reduce the 
aggregate LIS. On the other hand, the rise in the LIS in the relatively large 
Manufacturing sector would have raised the aggregate LIS. 
Shift-share analysis 
Shift-share analysis provides a means of tracking the ‘within-industry’ changes in LIS 
and the ‘between-industry’ shifts in industry mix and establishing their relative 
importance in explaining the fall in aggregate LIS.  
The essence of the methodology is to add up: 
• the within-industry or change in LIS components 
– these are the change in an industry’s LIS, weighted by the relative size of the 
industry 
• the between-industry or structural change components 
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– these are the change in the relative size (total income) of an industry, weighted 
by the LIS of the industry. 
The sum of these two components across industries equals the change in market sector 
LIS. The methodology is set out in appendix A. 
Structural change a major contributor, but ‘within-industry’ effects more important 
The widespread falls in industry LISs had the greater effect on reducing the market 
sector LIS in the 2000s (figure 5.1). 
However, the structural change component was also important. Between-industry 
effects accounted for around 40 per cent of the 2000s fall. The structural change 
component was pivotal in explaining the change between decades. It changed from a 
small positive component in the 1990s to a much larger negative component in the 
2000s (figure 5.1). 
Figure 5.1 Decomposition of change in the market sector labour income share 
into between-industry and within-industry componentsa 
percentage points 
 
a 1989-90 to 1999-00 and 1999-00 to 2009-10. 
Data source: Author’s estimates based on ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0550.02). 
Mining was the largest industry contributor to the 2000s fall 
Industry results are presented in table 5.4. Entries in the ‘total contribution’ column are 
the sum of entries in the ‘within’ column and the ‘between’ column. The industry 
contributions sum to the market sector totals at the bottom of the table. 
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The Mining sector was the stand-out contributor, accounting for half of the decline in 
market sector LIS. Most of that contribution came from structural change — the shift in 
activity towards this capital-intensive industry. This was, by far, the largest single 
contribution of all the within-industry and structural change elements. 
It was quite a long way back to the ‘second tier’ contributions from Retail 
(-0.6 percentage points) and Accommodation (-0.4 percentage points). A within-
industry fall in LIS was the more important element in both cases. 
Construction only made a small negative total contribution. Its positive structural 
change contribution (shift toward an industry with above-average LIS) was more than 
offset by a relatively-large negative within-industry contribution. 
Table 5.4 Industry contributions to the change in the market sector LIS 
through within, between and total effects  
percentage points  
 1989-90 to 1999-00  1999-00 to 2009-10 
 within between total  within between total 
Agriculture 0.60 0.19 0.79  -0.45 0.24 -0.21 
Mining -0.50 0.09 -0.41  -0.27 -1.70 -1.97 
Manufacturing -0.44 -0.03 -0.47  0.38 -0.38 0.00 
Utilities -0.68 0.43 -0.25  0.16 0.04 0.20 
Construction 0.00 -0.08 -0.08  -0.40 0.33 -0.08 
Wholesale 0.23 0.00 0.23  -0.15 -0.09 -0.25 
Retail 0.45 0.09 0.54  -0.48 -0.11 -0.59 
Accommodation 0.13 0.24 0.37  -0.33 -0.07 -0.41 
Transport -0.24 -0.01 -0.25  -0.24 0.00 -0.23 
Telecoms -0.34 -0.20 -0.54  -0.36 0.16 -0.20 
Finance -1.05 -0.27 -1.32  -0.13 -0.07 -0.20 
Arts & rec 0.00 0.01 0.01  -0.08 0.01 -0.07 
Market sector  -1.9 0.5 -1.4  -2.4 -1.6 -4.0 
Source: Author’s estimates based on ABS (Cat No 5260.0550.02). 
Manufacturing made no overall contribution. Its relatively-large and positive ‘within’ 
contribution (0.4 percentage points) was offset by a relatively-large and negative 
‘between’ contribution (-0.4 percentage points), which came about because there was a 
shift away from this industry with its above-average LIS. 
The major industry contributors to the within-industry component of the LIS fall were: 
Retail (-0.5 percentage points), Agriculture (-0.5 percentage points), Construction (-0.4 
percentage points), Telecoms (-0.4 percentage points) and Accommodation (-0.4 
percentage points).  
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The ACTU study 
The ACTU (2013) drew attention to the fall in Australia’s LIS as ‘a worrying 
development’. It correctly associated the fall with a growth in real wages that has not 
kept pace with labour productivity growth (chapter 4). The ACTU study states that a 
period in which real wages rise faster than labour productivity growth is needed merely 
to restore the labour income share of the 1990s. 
The ACTU study included a shift-share analysis. It attributed a higher proportion (72 
per cent, rather than the 59 per cent found here1) to the within-industry component.2 By 
way of further comparison, an OECD (2012) study attributed around two-thirds of the 
fall in Australia’s LIS from 1990 to 2007 to within-industry effects.  
The difference in shift-share results between this and the ACTU study does not matter a 
lot. It is likely due to several factors: 
• different industry coverage 
– the ACTU study covered all industries, rather than the 12-industry market sector 
used here 
– this may be the most important explanation for the difference in results 
• different method of calculating labour income shares 
– the ACTU used an alternative method of allocating the income of sole 
proprietors to labour and capital components, whereas the ABS method is relied 
upon here 
– measurement of income shares is an imprecise science and there are arguments in 
support of different approaches 
• different time periods 
– the ACTU calculations cover 1999-00 to 2011-12, whereas the end-point used 
here is 2009-10 and the shift-share analysis is sensitive to the choice of end-
points 
– however, there was little change in the aggregate LIS over 2009-10 to 2011-12. 
                                              
1 The ACTU study attributes -4.2 out of -5.8 percentage points to within-industry effects, whereas this 
study attributes -2.4 out of -4.0 percentage points (table 5.4). 
2 The methodology in this study weights share shifts by the deviation of industry LISs from the 
market sector average. This highlights the role of share shifts by industries with above- and below-
average LISs. The ACTU method does not include the market sector average in the calculation of 
structural change effects. However, this methodological difference affects the distribution of, and not 
the sum of, structural change effects across industries.  
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The common conclusion from the two studies is that within-industry and structural 
change were both important, with at least some weighting in importance toward the 
within-industry component. 
To the extent that the difference is due to industry coverage, it is likely that the 
importance of structural change via Mining and Manufacturing, found here, is ‘diluted’ 
by the inclusion of more labour-intensive industries in the ACTU study.  
The ACTU report does not present contributions from individual industries, although it 
does refer to the falls in LIS in Retail, Accommodation and Transport (which, along 
with the highest fall in Agriculture, have also been highlighted here). 
Seemingly based on the structural change contribution coming in at 28 per cent of the 
LIS fall, the report concludes: 
Only a small portion of the fall in the labour share can be ascribed to a shift in economic 
activity towards low-labour share industries such as mining. 
It’s clear that the mining boom has contributed to the fall in the labour share in the 2000s, 
but that it accounts for a small part of it. (ACTU 2013, p. 16) 
This seems to underplay the role of the mining boom, for two reasons. First, in the shift-
share analysis here, Mining accounted for half of the decline in the LIS. Second, as will 
now be demonstrated, the shift-share approach captures structural change in a way that 
is limited in this income share context. 
5.3 Industry contributions to growth in factor incomes 
This section looks at industry contributions to the fall in the LIS in terms of disparities 
in individual industry’s contributions to labour income growth and to capital income 
growth.  
Industry contributions to the 2000s growth in factor incomes 
The fall in the LIS came about as a divergence between growth in market sector capital 
income and growth in market sector labour income (section 4.2 in the previous chapter). 
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As an extension, industry contributions to the fall in the aggregate LIS can be viewed as 
the difference between: 
• industry contributions to growth in market sector capital income 
– growth in industries’ capital income weighted by the industries’ share in market 
sector capital income 
• industry contributions to growth in market sector labour income 
– growth in industries’ labour income, weighted by the industries’ share in market 
sector labour income. 
Industry contributions to growth in labour and capital income and the difference 
between them are shown in figure 5.2 and table 5.5.  
Figure 5.2 Industry contributions to growth in labour income, growth in 
capital income and to the difference between them 
percentage points 
 
Source: Author’s estimates based on ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0550.02). 
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Table 5.5 Industry contributions to the growth gap between labour income 
and capital income in the 2000s decade 
percentage points 
 Labour income Capital income difference 
Agriculture 0.04 0.31 -0.27 
Mining 0.35 2.11 -1.76 
Manufacturing 0.63 0.48 0.16 
Utilities 0.17 0.31 -0.14 
Construction 1.07 0.65 0.42 
Wholesale 0.48 0.37 0.11 
Retail 0.51 0.37 0.14 
Accommodation 0.25 0.17 0.08 
Transport 0.54 0.52 0.03 
Telecoms 0.13 0.47 -0.35 
Finance 1.06 1.25 -0.19 
Arts & rec 0.60 0.46 0.14 
Market sector  5.8 7.5 -1.6 
Source: Author’s estimates based on ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0550.02). 
The Mining sector stands out 
From this point of view, Mining more than accounted for all of the decline in the 
market sector LIS in the 2000s. There were other industry contributions that basically 
offset each other. But Mining accounted for a little more (-1.8 percentage points) than 
the entire excess of growth in capital income over growth in labour income at the 
market sector level. 
The ‘second tier’ contributors to the income growth gap were Telecoms (-0.4 
percentage points), Agriculture (-0.3 percentage points), Finance (-0.2 percentage 
points) and Utilities  (-0.1 percentage points). Finance made strong contributions to 
both labour and capital income, but the difference between the two was relatively small 
and in favour of capital income. 
It is of particular interest that Construction and Manufacturing worked in the direction 
of increasing the market sector LIS. The Construction contribution is fairly large, 
contributing 0.4 percentage points more to labour income than to capital income. The 
Manufacturing contribution was on the low side of 0.2 percentage points. 
The industry contributions to the decline in LIS according to this approach differ in 
some important ways from the findings of the shift-share analysis. But before 
discussing and examining these differences, the issue of structural change is explored 
further. 
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‘Dynamic’ structural change 
Shift-share analysis captures structural change in terms of: 
• changes in the industry structure of total income 
• a ‘comparative static’ analysis of changes in structure and income shares at the start 
and end of the 2000s decade. 
There is a different way to look at the role of structural change, and that is to capture it 
in terms of: 
• separate changes in the industry structure of labour income and of capital income 
• a ‘dynamic’ view of structural change based on changes in growth rates. 
For the current purposes, the ‘dynamic’ approach takes the growth in factor incomes in 
the 1990s as a benchmark. The various industry contributions delivered an aggregate 
LIS that was stable over that decade. 
The benchmark comparison is then an exercise to calculate: 
• industry contributions to the acceleration in labour income growth in the 2000s (in 
comparison to the 1990s) 
– these are simply the changes in industry contributions to labour income growth 
between the two decades 
• industry contributions to the acceleration in capital income growth in the 2000s 
– these are the changes in industry contributions to capital income growth between 
the decades 
• industry contributions to the wider gap in growth in factor incomes 
– these are the difference between the first two calculations and are the industry 
contributions to the difference in accelerations in labour and capital income. 
The results are displayed in table 5.6 and figure 5.3.  
As was reported in the previous chapter, labour income accelerated by 1.5 percentage 
points between the decades (from 4.3 to 5.8 per cent a year). Capital income accelerated 
by 2.6 percentage points (from 4.9 to 7.5 per cent a year). The gap between labour 
income growth and capital income growth therefore opened up by 1.1 percentage 
points. These values are shown in the ‘Market sector’ row at the bottom of table 5.6. 
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Table 5.6 Changes in industry contributions to labour income growth, capital 
income growth and to the wider gap between labour and capital 
income growth  
Percentage points 
 Labour income Capital income difference 
Agriculture -0.11 0.38 -0.49 
Mining 0.29 1.48 -1.19 
Manufacturing 0.05 -0.25 0.30 
Utilities 0.25 0.08 0.17 
Construction 0.58 0.43 0.15 
Wholesale 0.04 0.14 -0.09 
Retail -0.07 0.25 -0.32 
Accommodation -0.15 0.08 -0.23 
Transport 0.21 0.16 0.04 
Telecoms -0.08 -0.18 0.10 
Finance 0.41 -0.16 0.56 
Arts & rec 0.13 0.18 -0.05 
Market sector 12 1.5 2.6 -1.1 
Source: Author’s estimates based on ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0550.02). 
Figure 5.3 Industry contributions to accelerations in labour income and 
capital income and to the difference between the two 
percentage points 
 
Data source: Author’s estimates based on ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0550.02). 
From this view point, Mining made by far the strongest structural contribution to the 
fall in the aggregate LIS. It accounted for 1.2 percentage points of the 1.1 wider gap 
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contributed so much (1.5 percentage points) to the acceleration in capital income 
growth. 
Again, the contributions from other industries were smaller and essentially offset each 
other. The ‘second tier’ contributors to the wider factor income growth gap were 
Agriculture (-0.5 percentage points), Retail (-0.3 percentage points) and 
Accommodation (-0.2 percentage points). Finance made a relatively large counter 
contribution (0.6 percentage points). It had a much stronger labour income contribution, 
whereas its capital contribution fell. 
Construction and Manufacturing also moved in the counter direction, working to 
narrow the gap between labour and capital income growth. Construction had a much 
larger labour contribution, whereas Manufacturing mostly had a smaller capital 
contribution. 
With this approach, ‘within-industry’ and reallocation effects between industries are not 
distinguished. Rather this approach identifies what the different industries contributed 
to the observed aggregate difference between labour and capital income growth. This 
takes account of the importance of an industry to market sector labour or capital 
income, which the shift-share approach does not. The shift share approach takes 
account of the importance of an industry in terms of its share of total income in the 
market sector.  
A digression on scale and reallocation effects  
There is a way to calculate reallocation effects, within the factor income decomposition 
approach. But, rather than distinguish between ‘within’ and ‘between’ effects, the 
approach suggested here distinguishes between ‘scale’ and ‘reallocation’ effects. 
This further decomposition is presented here, more for methodological illustration and 
confirmation of trends, than for provision of fresh insights. 
The first step is to scale up the industry contributions to factor income growth in the 
1990s, according to the additional growth in factor incomes in the 2000s. Each 1990s 
contribution is multiplied by the ratio of 2000s growth to 1990s growth at the market 
sector level. The results are the entries under the ‘Scale’ column in table 5.7.  
The second step is to take the difference between the actual 2000s industry 
contributions (table 5.5) and the scaled up contributions. These are the reallocation 
effects.  
The net contributions in panel C of table 5.7 are the differences between the labour 
contributions (panel A) and the capital contributions (panel B). 
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Table 5.7 Scale and reallocation contributions in the 2000s to labour income 
growth, capital income growth and the difference between them 
 percentage points 
 Scale Reallocation Total 
A. Labour income 
Agriculture 0.21 -0.16 0.04 
Mining 0.08 0.27 0.35 
Manufacturing 0.79 -0.16 0.63 
Utilities -0.10 0.27 0.17 
Construction 0.66 0.41 1.07 
Wholesale 0.59 -0.11 0.48 
Retail 0.80 -0.28 0.51 
Accommodation 0.55 -0.29 0.25 
Transport 0.46 0.09 0.54 
Telecoms 0.28 -0.16 0.13 
Finance 0.89 0.17 1.06 
Arts & rec 0.64 -0.04 0.60 
Market sector 12 5.8 0.0 5.8 
B. Capital income 
Agriculture -0.10 0.42 0.31 
Mining 0.97 1.14 2.11 
Manufacturing 1.11 -0.64 0.48 
Utilities 0.36 -0.05 0.31 
Construction 0.32 0.32 0.65 
Wholesale 0.36 0.01 0.37 
Retail 0.19 0.18 0.37 
Accommodation 0.14 0.03 0.17 
Transport 0.54 -0.02 0.52 
Telecoms 1.00 -0.52 0.47 
Finance 2.16 -0.91 1.25 
Arts & rec 0.43 0.03 0.46 
Market sector 12 7.5 0.0 7.5 
C. Labour income less capital income 
Agriculture 0.31 -0.58 -0.27 
Mining -0.89 -0.87 -1.76 
Manufacturing -0.32 0.48 0.16 
Utilities -0.46 0.32 -0.14 
Construction 0.34 0.08 0.42 
Wholesale 0.23 -0.12 0.11 
Retail 0.61 -0.47 0.14 
Accommodation 0.41 -0.33 0.08 
Transport -0.09 0.11 0.03 
Telecoms -0.71 0.37 -0.35 
Finance -1.27 1.08 -0.19 
Arts & rec 0.21 -0.07 0.14 
Market sector 12 -1.6 0.0 -1.6 
Source: Author’s estimates based on ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0550.02). 
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In brief, the results suggest that the most important reallocations among market sector 
industries in the 2000s were: 
• Mining (-0.9 percentage points) because of the very large reallocation of capital 
income toward the industry (1.1 percentage points) 
• Agriculture (-0.6 percentage points), mostly because of an increased allocation of 
capital income 
• Retail (-0.5 percentage points), fairly evenly divided between negative labour and 
positive capital reallocations 
• in the other direction, Finance (1.1 percentage points), Manufacturing 
(0.5 percentage points) and Telecoms (0.4 percentage points), mainly because of 
lower allocations of capital income. 
5.4 Assessment of the role of change in industry 
structure 
There are some important differences between the shift-share results and the results of 
the analysis based on industry decompositions of factor income growth. 
• The shift-share analysis attributes an important but less-than-complete role to 
structural change and the mining boom, whereas the analysis based on the industry 
decomposition of growth in factor incomes attributes the fall in market sector LIS 
overwhelmingly to Mining. 
– A ‘dynamic’ view of structural change, using the decomposition of factor 
incomes approach, similarly attributes the changes in growth rates 
overwhelmingly to Mining. 
• Construction has a slight negative effect on the aggregate LIS in the shift-share 
analysis but has a positive role in the factor income decomposition analysis. 
• Manufacturing had a positive ‘within’ effect, but no overall effect, in the shift-share 
analysis, whereas it is found to have had a positive effect on the aggregate LIS in the 
factor income decomposition analysis. 
The differences arise because shift-share analysis captures relative size and ‘between’ 
effects in terms of total income. The industry decomposition of factor incomes 
approach, on the other hand, captures the relative size and significance of industries in 
terms of labour income and capital income separately. 
Consequently, the within-industry changes in LIS in the shift-share analysis overlook 
the significance that some changes have on the market sector as a whole. Mining and 
Construction are two prime examples.  
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In Mining, there was strong growth in labour income, but from a small base as far as the 
market sector is concerned. The within-industry fall in Mining LIS is not all that large 
(below average at -2 percentage points), because there is not a lot of difference between 
growth in industry labour and capital income. However, while the growth in mining 
labour income had comparatively little significance for the market sector growth in 
labour income, the growth in capital income in Mining, which is a large source of 
market sector capital income, had a large effect on aggregate capital income growth. 
And so, the effect of the growth in factor incomes in Mining has a much greater effect 
on the market sector LIS than the change in within-industry LIS indicates.  
The LIS in Construction fell because capital income grew faster than labour income in 
the 2000s. The fall of 4 percentage points was of the same magnitude as the fall in the 
market sector average. This within-industry effect outweighed the structural-change 
effect in the shift-share analysis. However, because the industry is the major source of 
labour income, the growth in Construction labour income had a larger effect on market 
sector labour income than the growth in Construction capital income had on market 
sector capital income. The contribution to aggregate LIS, from the perspective of 
industry contributions to growth in factor incomes, was positive. 
In similar vein, shift-share analysis implicitly assumes in this context that increases in 
the size (total output and income) of industries can be separated from the way in which 
industries expand (in capital- or labour-intensive ways). The prime case that challenges 
this view is Mining, where the expansion of the industry has necessitated higher unit 
capital requirements. That is, because of depletion and decline in the ‘quality’ of 
resource deposits, proportionately more capital investment is needed to maintain and 
increase output (Topp et al. 2008). 
5.5 Key point summary 
• There were large reallocations of labour and capital income across industries in the 
2000s. 
– The biggest shifts were in capital income — toward Mining and away from 
Manufacturing. 
– The biggest labour income shifts were toward Construction and Finance and 
away from Manufacturing. 
 Manufacturing’s capital income shift was greater than its labour income shift. 
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• Most industries experienced falls in LIS in the 2000s. 
– Mining and Construction each had falls of -4 percentage points. 
– The largest falls were in Agriculture (-9 percentage points), Accommodation (-8 
percentage points), Retail (-6 percentage points) and Telecoms (-6 percentage 
points). 
– The LIS increased in two industries — the Utilities (4 percentage points) and, 
importantly, Manufacturing (2 percentage points). 
 The rise in Manufacturing’s share was because there was greater downward 
adjustment in capital income growth than in labour income growth.  
• Shift-share analysis attributes important roles to both within-industry falls in LIS 
and to between-industry shifts toward low-LIS industries and away from high-LIS 
industries. 
– It attributes more to the ‘within’ than the ‘between’ effects. 
– The largest industry effect was through Mining, which accounts for half of the 
fall in the aggregate LIS, mostly through a between-industry effect (shift to an 
industry with a low LIS). 
– However, the shift-share approach underestimates the effects of the Mining 
industry on the aggregate LIS. 
• Analysis based on industry decompositions of labour income and capital income 
growth generates some different results. 
– It attributes the difference in market sector labour and capital income growth 
(and therefore the fall in LIS) overwhelmingly to the Mining industry. 
– The ‘second-tier’ contributors were Telecoms, Agriculture, Finance and the 
Utilities. 
– Construction and Manufacturing are both found to have had positive effects on 
the LIS. 
• A ‘dynamic’ view of structural change, based on the change in growth rates in factor 
incomes from the 1990s to the 2000s also attributes the changes in factor income 
growth rates overwhelmingly to Mining. 
• The mining boom essentially explained all of the fall in the LIS, even though the 
other ‘major movers’, Construction and Manufacturing, worked in the direction of 
increasing the LIS. 
– There were some other factors, operating in the ‘second-tier’ industries, but they 
were swamped by the Mining sector effects. 
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6 Other industry contributions 
This chapter continues the exploration of the industry sources of the fall in the 
labour income share (LIS).  
• Section 6.1 identifies the industry sources of the ‘quantity versus price’ 
explanation for the decline in the labour income share. 
• Section 6.2 identifies the industries that contributed to the shortfall between 
market sector growth in real wages and labour productivity. 
• Section 6.3 identifies industry contributions to the increased output price 
inflation in the 2000s, which was a major reason for the weaker real wage 
growth. 
There is a summary in section 6.4.  
6.1 Factor proportions and reward ratios 
Chapter 4 noted that the fall in the LIS came about through a quantity effect, rather 
than a price effect (section 4.3). A step up in the rate of capital deepening was found 
to be the key.  
Industry contributions to the market sector growth in factor proportions and growth 
in the reward ratio are now assessed.  
The analysis of wage and return estimates, particularly at the industry level, should 
be treated with caution. They provide only prima facie evidence that needs further 
examination and confirmation. These wage and return estimates are based on 
national accounts data, which are not primarily designed to reveal wage and rate of 
return trends.1  
  
                                              
1 As discussed in chapter 3, the ‘wage’ is the cost of labour to the industry. It will vary across 
industries with the skill mix of employees as well as any variations in labour on-costs. It will 
also vary with the utilisation rate of labour employed in the industry. As a result of these factors 
there can be substantial variations in the real wage (cost of labour) across industries. 
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Industry contributions are calculated in a way that allows ‘additivity’ (see appendix 
A for details of the methodology). The industry contributions add to market sector 
rates of growth. But there is further additivity in that industry contributions to 
growth in the capital-labour ratio, for example, can be formed from the separate 
industry contributions to capital growth and to labour growth.  
The industry contributions to the market sector developments in the two decades are 
shown in table 6.1, with three columns for each decade.  
• The first column shows industry contributions to growth in the market sector 
reward ratio (wage rate to rate of return).  
• The second presents the industry contributions to growth in market sector factor 
proportions (the capital-labour ratio).  
• The third contains the industry contributions to the gap in growth between the 
reward ratio and factor proportions; 
– that is, entries in column 1 less the entries in column 2 
– these do not show magnitudes of contributions to change in the aggregate 
LIS, but they do indicate direction (negative entries in this third column 
indicate cases that contributed to the fall in the market sector LIS).2 
The industry contributions for the 2000s decade are also displayed visually in 
figure 6.1. 
                                              
2 The entries are not a reliable indicator of the extent of an industry’s contribution to the fall in 
LIS because the gap in growth between the reward ratio and factor proportions is equal to the 
growth in the LIS less the growth in the capital income share. See box 4.1 in chapter 4.   
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Table 6.1 Industry contributions to the gap in growth between reward 
ratios and factor proportions, 1990s and 2000s  
per cent per year  
 1989-90 to 1999-00  1999-00 to 2009-10 
 w/r K/L Gap (pp)  w/r K/L Gap (pp) 
Agriculture 0.24 0.00 0.24  -0.04 0.22 -0.27 
Mining -0.05 0.55 -0.60  -0.75 1.11 -1.87 
Manufacturing 0.72 0.85 -0.13  1.04 0.84 0.20 
Utilities -0.14 0.19 -0.33  0.05 0.20 -0.15 
Construction 0.24 -0.07 0.31  0.34 -0.08 0.43 
Wholesale 0.47 0.25 0.23  0.43 0.31 0.12 
Retail 0.55 0.04 0.51  0.24 0.09 0.15 
Accommodation 0.14 -0.20 0.34  0.09 0.00 0.09 
Transport 0.06 0.07 0.00  0.25 0.22 0.03 
Telecoms 0.11 0.56 -0.46  0.13 0.49 -0.36 
Finance -0.11 0.65 -0.77  0.38 0.56 -0.18 
Arts & rec 0.07 0.02 0.05  0.02 0.00 0.01 
Market sector 12 2.3 2.9 -0.6  2.2 4.0 -1.8 
Note:  pp = percentage points. 
Source: Author’s estimates based on ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0550.02). 
Figure 6.1 Industry contributions to growth in the reward ratio, factor 
proportions and the gap between them, 2000s 
percentage points 
 
Data source: Author’s estimates based on ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0550.02). 
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
Ag
ric
M
in
in
g
M
an
uf
U
til
iti
es
Co
ns
tr
W
sa
le
Re
ta
il
Ac
co
m
Tr
an
sp
Te
lc
o
Fi
na
n
Ar
ts
𝑤 𝑟⁄�
𝐾 𝐿⁄�
growth gap
   
88 LABOUR'S SHARE OF 
GROWTH IN INCOME 
AND PROSPERITY 
 
 
Mining made the largest contribution 
The mining boom stands out as the driver of the fall in the LIS from the quantity 
and price perspective. 
The Mining sector had a profound effect. In a sense, it alone contributed all (strictly, 
a little more than all) of the gap between growth in the reward ratio and growth in 
the capital-labour ratio at the market sector level.3  
Mining’s contribution came, in large part, from a very strong contribution to growth 
in the market sector capital-labour ratio, as a result of the industry’s heavy capital 
investment. However, with strong growth in returns on the back of higher resource 
rents, Mining also made a strong negative contribution to the wage-return ratio. 
It should be noted, however, that the growth in capital in Mining is overstated 
somewhat in ABS estimates. Topp et al. (2008) drew attention to the fact that the 
ABS assumption that mining investment is added to the capital stock as it occurs, 
rather than when development projects are completed means that growth in capital 
input in Mining occurs in advance of when it produces output. This becomes a 
problem when there is an acceleration in investment, as has occurred in the past 
decade. In reality, annual investment represents work-in-progress, until the project 
is completed and production then comes on stream. Topp et al. estimated the typical 
lag between commencement and completion of a project in the mining industry to 
be three years. 
With a rapid acceleration in investment continuing through the latter part of the 
decade, the extent of growth in capital in Mining (and the market sector as a whole) 
is likely overstated. Since the capital stock is the base for calculating the rate of 
return, this also means that the growth in the rate of return on capital would be 
understated.  
This measurement issue is likely to soften the conclusion, but is very unlikely to 
undermine the conclusion that the fall in the LIS was attributable to a quantity 
effect. 
‘Second-tier’ contributors 
The set of second-tier contributors to the fall in LIS is the same set identified in the 
decomposition analysis of factor income growth (section 5.3 of the previous 
chapter). The set comprises Telecoms, Agriculture, Finance and the Utilities. The 
                                              
3 There is a small approximation or rounding error between the market sector growth gap reported 
here (-1.8 percentage points) and that reported in chapter 4 (-1.7 percentage points). 
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negative LIS effect in these industries was due to a dominant capital contribution. In 
the case of Finance, this was still the case even though the industry made the 
strongest contribution of all industries to growth in the average wage rate. 
Construction, while it generated a lot more income via the mining boom, had a 
positive effect on the LIS. It made a stronger contribution to growth in use of labour 
than it did to growth in use of capital. It also made a stronger contribution to growth 
in the average wage than it did to the rate of return. 
Manufacturing, which was negatively affected by the mining and terms of trade 
booms, also made a positive contribution to the LIS. That positive influence came 
despite a fall in its use of labour. Manufacturing made, by far, the largest 
contribution to the growth in the reward ratio, as well as a strong contribution to the 
growth in the capital-labour ratio. The reward ratio effect came about because 
Manufacturing was a strong source of growth in wages, whereas it had a negative 
impact on the rate of return. It was a source of growth in capital but reduction in use 
of labour. 
Some broader implications 
It would appear at face value from these results that some of the gains from the 
mining boom were captured by the Construction sector. Furthermore, it seems that 
labour captured more of the gains than capital in both quantity (employment) and 
price (wage) terms. It also appears that, in Manufacturing, capital has borne more of 
the burden of adjustment through lower returns than labour has through moderation 
of wage growth. There is no way to tell from the current analysis, but this may be 
because of a tendency for wage relativities to be maintained across industries. 
The importance of wage growth in Finance is of interest. This could be a case of 
skill-biased technological change associated with information and communications 
technologies. Since there was little change in employment in the industry, the strong 
wage growth could reflect some substitution of more skilled for less skilled 
workers. Further research is needed to take this view beyond mere speculation. 
6.2 Real product wage and labour productivity 
Chapter 4 also analysed the LIS fall as a shortfall between growth in the real 
product wage and growth in labour productivity (section 4.4). From this 
‘productivity and cost’ perspective, the fall in LIS was shown to be equivalent to a 
fall in real unit labour costs (RULC).  
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The industry contributions to growth in the real product wage (RPW) and labour 
productivity (LP) are now assessed. The details of the ‘additive’ methodology are 
set out in appendix A. Again, the wage estimates used here need to be treated with 
caution. 
Table 6.2 presents the industry contributions to the decline in market sector labour 
income share as decompositions of the rate of growth in market sector RULC. The 
decline in market sector RULC at 0.7 per cent a year over the 2000s is 
(approximately) equivalent to the 4 percentage point fall in the LIS from 57 per cent 
to 53 per cent. 
Again, there are three columns for each decade in the table. An industry’s 
contribution to market sector growth in the RPW, less its contribution to 
market sector LP growth equals its contribution to growth in market sector RULC. 
Industry contributions in each column sum to the market sector growth presented at 
the bottom of each column. 
The contributions for the 2000s are also presented visually in figure 6.2. 
Table 6.2 Industry contributions to the real product wage (RPW), labour 
productivity (LP) and real unit labour costs (RULC), 1990s and 
2000s  
percentage points 
 1989-90 to 1999-00  1999-00 to 2009-10 
 
RPW LP RULC  RPW LP RULC 
Agriculture 0.27 0.19 0.08  0.12 0.24 -0.12 
Mining 0.08 0.31 -0.23  -0.61 0.16 -0.78 
Manufacturing 0.40 0.45 -0.06  0.45 0.38 0.07 
Utilities 0.03 0.15 -0.12  -0.11 -0.05 -0.06 
Construction 0.16 0.05 0.11  0.15 -0.03 0.18 
Wholesale 0.32 0.24 0.08  0.22 0.17 0.05 
Retail 0.30 0.11 0.19  0.17 0.10 0.07 
Accommodation 0.00 -0.12 0.13  0.01 -0.02 0.04 
Transport 0.17 0.18 -0.01  0.13 0.12 0.01 
Telecoms 0.21 0.38 -0.18  0.07 0.22 -0.15 
Financial 0.35 0.66 -0.30  0.53 0.62 -0.09 
Arts & rec 0.27 0.19 0.08  0.31 0.24 0.07 
Market sector 12 2.7 2.8 -0.1  1.4 2.2 -0.7 
Source: Author’s estimates based on ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0550.02). 
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Figure 6.2 Industry contributions to market sector growth in RPW, LP and 
RULC, 2000s 
percentage points 
 
Data source: Author’s estimates based on ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0550.02). 
Again Mining stands out 
The Mining sector stands out as the major contributor to the fall in LIS from the 
productivity and costs point of view: 
• On its own, Mining accounted for more than all of the decline in RULC. 
• That large negative contribution came about mostly through a negative 
contribution to RPW growth.  
– It was not just that Mining’s RPW contribution failed to keep up with its LP 
contribution. Its RPW contribution was strongly negative. 
• Its contribution to labour productivity growth was moderate.4 
This is the main industry, from the market sector perspective, that led to real wage 
growth trailing labour productivity growth. It was the industry that contributed most 
to the decline in RULC. 
                                              
4 Labour productivity declined within the industry in the 2000s. Nevertheless, it made a stronger 
contribution to market sector output growth than it did to market sector labour growth. 
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Mining also had the largest effect on the change in market sector RULC growth 
between the two decades. A sharper decline in the RPW contribution was the 
reason. The sector’s contribution to growth in market sector labour productivity fell 
between the decades. 
Other industries made largely offsetting contributions 
The ‘second-tier’ contributions to the LIS fall came from the same set of industries 
as appeared in the price-quantity analysis. They each were relatively small and, as a 
group, were offset by the industries that made positive contributions. 
Again Construction and Manufacturing are found to have made positive 
contributions to the aggregate LIS. From the market sector point of view: 
• the activities in Construction added to growth in real wages but added nothing to 
labour productivity 
– Construction added equally to output growth and growth in use of labour 
• Manufacturing added to both RPW growth and LP growth, with the balance 
leaning a little toward the former 
– while the industry only made a small output contribution, its labour 
contribution was negative.  
6.3 Industry sources of product price inflation 
Chapter 4 drew attention to the fact that an increase in product price inflation in the 
2000s was the main reason for growth in the real product wage to trail growth in 
labour productivity. 
The industry contributions to product price inflation are shown in table 6.3 and 
figure 6.3. 
The Mining industry made the most important contribution to product price 
inflation. It accounted for 25 per cent of the market sector inflation in the 2000s and 
for over a third of the additional inflation in the 2000s, compared with the 1990s. 
Other industries also made important contributions. Manufacturing, Construction, 
and Finance each contributed around 0.4 percentage points or 13 per cent of the 
2000s product price inflation. 
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Table 6.3 Industry contributions to market sector product price inflation, 
1990s and 2000s  
 1989-90 to 1999-00  1999-00 to  2009-10  decadal change 
 
pp %  pp %  pp % 
Agriculture -0.12 -11  0.10 3  0.22 10 
Mining 0.03 3  0.78 23  0.75 33 
Manufacturing 0.38 35  0.40 12  0.02 1 
Utilities -0.04 -4  0.18 5  0.22 10 
Construction 0.10 9  0.40 12  0.30 13 
Wholesale 0.08 7  0.22 6  0.14 6 
Retail 0.12 11  0.16 5  0.04 2 
Accommodation 0.13 12  0.16 5  0.02 1 
Transport 0.06 6  0.24 7  0.18 8 
Telecoms -0.05 -4  0.07 2  0.12 5 
Finance 0.35 32  0.41 12  0.06 3 
Arts & rec 0.15 14  0.23 7  0.08 3 
Market sector 12 1.1 100  3.4 100  2.3 100 
Source: Author’s estimates based on ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0550.02). 
Figure 6.3 Industry contributions to growth in product prices in the 1990s 
and the 2000sa 
percentage points 
 
a 1999-00 to 2009-10. 
Data source: Author’s estimates based on ABS (Cat. no. 5260.0550.02). 
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6.4 Key point summary  
• There are some data measurement issues that caution against taking the findings 
as being precise. 
• Nevertheless, the mining boom, and specifically the mining industry, were the 
principal drivers of the fall in the LIS, according to the analysis in this chapter.  
– From both the ‘quantity and price’ and ‘productivity and cost’ points of view, 
Mining alone accounted for more than the entire changes associated with the 
fall in market sector LIS. 
– Mining was not assisted in this role by the other two industries most affected 
by the mining boom. Construction and Manufacturing worked in the 
direction of increasing the LIS. 
• The same set of ‘second tier’ contributors to the fall in LIS were observed. 
– Telecoms, Agriculture, Finance and the Utilities.  
• Mining had a profound effect on the Market sector LIS through:  
– growth in its capital stock 
 it also contributed to relatively strong growth in the rate of return, but this 
was offset by relatively strong growth in wage contributions in other 
industries (relative to their rate of return contributions) 
– its negative effect on the real product wage 
– its role in lifting product price inflation, which was the main factor holding 
back growth in the real product wage. 
• It would seem, at first glance, that Construction may have captured some of the 
rents from mining. 
– It further appears that labour captured more of the rents than capital, and so 
the sector had a positive effect on the LIS. 
• Manufacturing had a positive effect on the LIS because capital bore more of the 
adjustment than labour. 
– There was downward adjustment in employment but not wages, which may 
be because wages are determined by broader conditions than those facing the 
industry itself. 
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7 Product and consumer prices 
The shift in the terms of trade affected prosperity and its distribution in another 
way.  
7.1 A wedge between product and consumer prices 
Ordinarily, movements in the prices of goods and services produced in Australia are 
closely aligned with movements in the prices of the goods and services that 
Australians consume. Movements in the GDP implicit price deflator, representing 
product prices, and the CPI, representing consumer prices, were closely aligned 
from 1959-60 to the end of the 20th century (figure 7.1). 
Figure 7.1 Product and consumer pricesa, 1959-60 to 2011-12 
indexes, 1999-00=100 
 
a GDP implicit price deflator and price deflator for households’ final consumption expenditure. 
Data sources: ABS (Cat. no. 5204.0); author estimates. 
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However, product prices rose faster than consumer prices in the first decade of the 
2000s. The GDP deflator rose by an annual average of 3.7 per cent, whereas 
consumer prices rose 2.8 per cent a year on average. The two price series departed 
after 2002-03, as the terms of trade took off. 
The rise in product prices in the 12-industry market sector in the 2000s was quite 
similar to the rise for the economy as a whole (figure 7.2).1 According to these 
estimates, however, the market sector experienced a stronger fall in prices in 2009-
10, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.2 
Figure 7.2 GDP deflator, market sector prices and the CPI, 1990s and 
2000s 
indexes, 1999-00=100 
 
Data sources: ABS (Cat. no. 5204.0); author estimates. 
  
                                              
1 Market sector prices are implicit prices formed from the ratio of current-price to chain-volume 
gross value added. 
2 The departure of market sector prices from the GDP deflator in the 1990s is of passing interest. 
There was much less rise in market sector prices from 1993-94 until the end of the decade. The 
market sector was the source of strong productivity gains over this period and the smaller rise in 
MS12 prices suggests that many of the productivity gains were passed on in the form of lower 
output prices than would otherwise be the case. This supports the conclusion of Parham et al. 
(2000). 
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The wedge between movements in product prices and consumer prices was a 
manifestation of the shift in the terms of trade. Higher export prices, especially for 
minerals, fuelled strong growth in product prices, as was demonstrated in the 
previous chapter. However, these would have had little direct effect on domestic 
consumer prices. Import prices, on the other hand, fell with exchange rate 
appreciation and lower supply prices for many goods on world markets. Lower 
import prices helped to keep domestic consumer prices in check.  
7.2 A wedge between real consumption wages and real 
product wages 
The wedge between consumer and product prices meant that there was also a wedge 
between real wages as a cost to producers and real wages as income to labour. 
While product prices are relevant to producers in determining the real cost of 
employing labour, consumer prices are relevant to workers in determining the real 
value of their incomes as wherewithal to purchase goods and services.3 The 
nominal wage deflated by an index of consumer prices is referred to as the real 
consumption wage (RCW). 
Whereas real product wage (RPW) growth fell behind labour productivity growth in 
the 2000s, RCW growth roughly kept pace with productivity growth (figure 7.3). 
Over the decade, labour productivity (LP) grew at 2.1 per cent a year on average 
and the RCW grew at 2.0 per cent a year. RPW, on the other hand, only grew at 1.1 
per cent a year (table 7.1).  
RCW growth and RPW growth diverged after 2003-04, once the terms of trade had 
started to rise (right panel of figure 7.3).  
The implication is that the consumption gain to workers — the increased purchasing 
power of their incomes — ‘compensated’ in a sense for the lower share of income 
growth from production (at producer prices) in the 2000s. The labour share of 
income from production fell over the 2000s as growth in the RPW fell behind LP 
growth. However, growth in RCW kept up with LP growth over the course of the 
decade.  
It is important to note, from a general living standards point of view, that this 
consumption gain was available to all residents and for all sources of income. 
                                              
3 There is a further wedge between wages as a cost and wages as income and that is the on-costs 
that add further costs of employing labour beyond the wage payments received by workers. On-
costs have not changed a lot as a proportion of total labour costs over the two decades.  
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Figure 7.3 Cumulative growth in labour productivity (LP), the real product 
wage (RPW) and the real consumption wage (RCW), 1990s and 
2000s 
per cent 
1990s 2000s 
  
Data source: Author’s estimates based on ABS (Cat. no. 5204.0; Cat. no. 5260.0550.02).  
Table 7.1 Growth in productivity, prices and real wages 
per cent per year 
Growth in 1990s 2000s 2002-03 to 2011-12 
Labour productivity 2.9 2.1 1.8 
Product prices 1.6 3.7 3.8 
Consumer prices 2.3 2.8 2.5 
Real Product Wage (RPW) 2.1 1.1 1.4 
Real Consumption Wage (RCW) 1.5 2.0 2.6 
Source: Author’s estimates based on ABS (Cat. no. 5204.0; Cat. no. 5260.0550.02). 
The 1990s 
There was also a wedge between producer and consumer prices in the 1990s. It was, 
however, smaller in size and opposite in direction. Consumer prices rose more than 
producer prices. The left-hand panel in figure 7.3 shows that the RCW grew less 
than the RPW over the 1990s. 
Timing, however, played a more precise role. It appears that the divergence in the 
real product and real consumption wages arose in the early 1990s recession. From 
1992-93, however, they ran in close parallel. A fall in the terms of trade in the early 
1990s was associated with an exchange rate depreciation, which in turn was likely 
influenced by the weakness of the domestic economy during the recession.  
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Labour productivity, the RCW and the RPW moved closely together (in parallel in 
figure 7.3) from 1994-95. This was the period of strong productivity growth in the 
1990s, outside of the recession and with relatively stable terms of trade. 
7.3 Key point summary 
• The terms of trade drove a wedge between growth in product prices and 
consumer prices in the 2000s. 
– Higher commodity export prices meant there was more growth in product 
prices than in consumer prices, which were also held in check by cheaper 
imports. 
• This in turn drove a wedge between growth in the RPW (based on product 
prices) and the RCW (based on consumption prices). 
– There was stronger growth in the RCW than in the RPW. 
• While growth in the RPW fell behind growth in labour productivity, growth in 
the RCW did not. 
– Both labour productivity and the RCW grew at an average rate of around 2 
per cent a year, whereas the RPW grew at half that rate. 
– One way to interpret this is to say that, while labour received a lower share of 
the income generated, the real value of the income received increased. These 
effects were offsetting. 
• However, the increased value of income was not confined to labour income. It 
applied to all forms of income. 
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A Methods for estimating industry 
contributions 
This appendix sets out the methods used to calculate industry contributions. The 
methods are based on the ‘chained Tornqvist aggregation’ approach developed in 
Parham (2012). 
A.1 Contributions to growth in market sector income 
First, assume that the market sector income (YMS) is related to the income in 
individual industries (Yi) according to a Tornqvist aggregation function. In period t: 
 𝑌𝑀𝑆
𝑡
𝑌𝑀𝑆
𝑡−1 = ∏� 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑌𝑖𝑡−1�𝑤𝑖𝑡  
where the exponents are the Tornqvist weights: 
 𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖𝑡+𝑣𝑖𝑡−12  
and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the share of industry i in market sector income in year t. 
Growth over one year can be written as: 
 𝑌�𝑀𝑆
𝑡,1 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑡 .𝑌�𝑖𝑡,1𝑖  
where the hat ‘^’ over a variable signifies the growth in that variable and the ‘1’ in 
the superscript refers to growth over 1 year. 
The growth in market sector income over n years accumulates the growth in each of 
the intervening years: 
 𝑌�𝑀𝑆
𝑡,𝑛 = ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑡+𝑗 .𝑌�𝑖𝑡+𝑗,1𝑖𝑛𝑗=1  
This ‘chaining’ method minimises approximation errors that arise from using base-
period or end-period shares. 
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The contribution of industry m to market sector income growth over n years is then: 
 ∑ 𝑤𝑚
𝑡+𝑗 .𝑌�𝑚𝑡+𝑗,1𝑛𝑗=1  
A.2 Factor proportions and relative rewards 
The objective is to analyse industry contributions to changes at the market sector 
level in the capital-labour ratio and the reward ratio. 
Care is needed in how this is done. To base the analysis on, for example, a weighted 
aggregation of changes in capital-labour ratios at the industry level would give 
misleading results in this case. It turns out that the change in the capital-labour ratio 
in Mining has been negative. While capital has obviously grown strongly in Mining, 
labour has grown even more — but off a low base, because Mining is capital 
intensive. 
To circumvent this problem, the contribution of industries to market sector capital 
deepening must be analysed as separate contributions to growth in market sector 
capital and to growth in market sector labour.  
Growth in the market sector capital labour ratio over n years from year t can be 
written as: 
 �𝐾
𝐿
�
𝑀𝑆
𝑡,𝑛� = 𝐾𝑀𝑆𝑡,𝑛� − 𝐿𝑀𝑆𝑡,𝑛�  
Industry contributions to growth in market sector capital can be written as: 
 𝐾𝑀𝑆
𝑡,𝑛� = ∑ ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑡+𝑗 .𝐾𝚤𝑡+𝚥,1�𝑖𝑛𝑗=1  
where the 𝑠𝑖
𝑡+𝑗 are Tornqvist weights formed from the average of the shares of 
industry i in market sector capital income in year t+j and the previous year. 
A similar relationship can be written for the industry contributions to growth in 
market sector labour use: 
 𝐿𝑀𝑆
𝑡,𝑛� = ∑ ∑ 𝑙𝑖𝑡+𝑗 .𝐿𝚤𝑡+𝚥,1�𝑖𝑛𝑗=1  
where the 𝑙𝑖
𝑡+𝑗 are weights formed from the average of the shares of industry i in 
market sector hours worked in year t+j and the previous year. 
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Because the industry contributions are additive, the contribution of industry i to 
growth in the market sector capital-labour ratio can be written as: 
 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏 𝑖𝑛𝑑 𝑖 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑡+𝑗𝐾𝚤𝑡+𝚥,1�𝑛𝑗=1 − ∑ 𝑙𝑖𝑡+𝑗 . 𝐿𝚤𝑡+𝚥,1�𝑛𝑗=1  
The same procedure can be used to analyse industry contributions to the reward 
ratio. That is, they are measured as the difference between an industry’s 
contribution to growth in the market sector average wage and that industry’s 
contribution to growth in the market sector gross profit rate. 
A.3 Productivity and costs 
Growth in the market sector real unit labour costs (RULC) can be decomposed into 
industry contributions by calculating industry decompositions of the market sector 
real product wage (RPW) and labour productivity (LP).  
Using a subscript MS to represent the market sector and a superscript t to represent 
time (years): 
 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐶𝑀𝑆𝑡 = 𝑅𝑃𝑊𝑀𝑆𝑡𝐿𝑃𝑀𝑆𝑡 = 𝑁𝑊𝑀𝑆𝑡𝑃𝑌𝑀𝑆𝑡 . 𝐻𝑀𝑆𝑡𝑌𝑀𝑆𝑡   (1) 
where NW refers to the nominal rate of compensation, PY to output prices, H to 
hours worked and Y refers to the volume of output. 
Now, each of the variables on the right hand side can be expressed as a Tornqvist 
aggregation of its industry counterparts. For example: 
 𝑁𝑊𝑀𝑆
𝑡
𝑁𝑊𝑀𝑆
𝑡−1 = ∏ � 𝑁𝑊𝑖𝑡𝑁𝑊𝑖𝑡−1�𝑞𝑖𝑡𝑖      and  𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑐𝑖𝑡+𝑙𝑐𝑖𝑡−12   (2) 
where the subscript i refers to industry and lci is the share that industry i has in total 
(nominal) labour costs in the market sector. 
The weights (qi in the above equation) used in the other aggregations are: 
• industry shares of nominal output for PY,  
• hours worked shares for H and  
• nominal output shares for Y. 
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The accuracy of this method in adding up to market sector growth rates is generally 
high, but does vary from case to case. 
Expressing (2) in terms of growth rates over a single year between t-1 and t as: 
 𝑁𝑊�𝑀𝑆
𝑡,1 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑡𝑖 .𝑁𝑊�𝑖𝑡,1 
From equation (1), growth in RULC can then be expressed as: 
 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐶� 𝑀𝑆
𝑡,1 = 𝑁𝑊�𝑀𝑆𝑡,1 − 𝑃𝑌�𝑀𝑆𝑡,1 + 𝐻�𝑀𝑆𝑡,1 − 𝑌�𝑀𝑆𝑡,1 
  = ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑡𝑖 .𝑁𝑊�𝑖𝑡,1 − ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑡 .𝑃𝑌�𝑖𝑡,1𝑖 + ∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 .𝑖 𝐻�𝑖𝑡,1 − ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑡 .𝑖 𝑌�𝑖𝑡,1 (3) 
where: 
• 𝑠𝑖
𝑡 is the average of industry i’s output share over t and t-1 and 
• 𝑢𝑖
𝑡 is the average of industry i’s hours worked share over t and t-1. 
Equation (3) expresses the growth in RULC in terms that are additive across 
industries and components (NW, PY, H and Y). Consequently, the contribution of 
(say) manufacturing to growth in RULC can be calculated by summing the four 
terms on the right hand side of (3) for i=manufacturing. 
Growth rates over a number of years are needed for the decadal comparisons in this 
paper. The ‘chaining’ method is used for this purpose.  
To illustrate for the case of hours worked, the average annual growth rate over n 
years from year t would be: 
 𝐻𝑀𝑆
𝑡,𝑛� = 1
𝑛
∑ ∑ 𝑢𝑖
𝑡+𝑗 .𝐻𝚤𝑡+𝚥,1�𝑖𝑛𝑗=1  
This formulation can be used on each of the terms on the right hand side of (3) to 
provide all components of the industry contributions market sector growth in 
RULC. 
A.4 Shift-share analysis 
Changes in the market sector LIS can be decomposed into a component that 
captures changes in industry LISs and a component that captures structural change 
(or change in an industry’s relative size). 
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The market sector labour income share in year t (𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑆𝑡 ) is the ratio of payments to 
labour (𝑊𝑀𝑆𝑡 ) to output (𝑌𝑀𝑆𝑡 ) in current prices. 
 𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑆𝑡 = 𝐿𝐼𝑀𝑆𝑡𝑌𝑀𝑆𝑡  
  = ∑ 𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡.𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑌𝑀𝑆
𝑡 .𝑌𝑖𝑡 
  = ∑𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡 .𝑦𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the current price share of industry i in market sector output in year t.  
That is, the aggregate LIS is the weighted sum of industry LISs, where the weights 
are the industry shares in aggregate value added. 
Now, the change in the market sector labour income share over n years is given by: 
 𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑆𝑡+𝑛 − 𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑆𝑡 = ∆𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑆𝑡,𝑛 = ∑𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡+𝑛.𝑦𝑖𝑡+𝑛 − ∑𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡 .𝑦𝑖𝑡 
                                    = ∑𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡+𝑛.𝑦𝑖𝑡+𝑛 − ∑𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡 .𝑦𝑖𝑡 + ∑𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡+𝑛.𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ∑𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡+𝑛.𝑦𝑖𝑡 
  ∆𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑆
𝑡,𝑛 = ∑∆𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡,𝑛.𝑦𝑖𝑡 + ∑𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡+𝑛.∆𝑦𝑖𝑡,𝑛       (1) 
The first term on the right hand side is the change in industry LIS component — the 
sum of contributions from changes in industry LISs, holding their size constant at 
their beginning-period share of market sector value added. The second term is the 
structural change or change in industry size component — the sum of contributions 
from the changes in the relative sizes of industries, holding their LISs constant at 
their starting period values. 
This decomposition can be further modified to highlight the effects of structural 
shifts toward or away from industries with different labour intensities. To do this, 
industry LISs are measured relative to the market sector average. The LIS is greater 
than average in labour-intensive industries, whereas it is below-average in capital-
intensive industries. 
Adding 𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑆𝑡+𝑛.∑𝑦𝑖𝑡 and subtracting 𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑆𝑡+𝑛.∑𝑦𝑖𝑡+𝑛 has no net effect on equation 
(1) because the sum of the output shares is unity irrespective of time. Therefore: 
 ∆𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑆
𝑡,𝑛 = ∑∆𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡,𝑛.𝑦𝑖𝑡 + ∑𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡+𝑛.∆𝑦𝑖𝑡,𝑛 + 𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑆𝑡+𝑛 ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑆𝑡+𝑛.∑𝑦𝑖𝑡+𝑛 
   =  ∑∆𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡,𝑛.𝑦𝑖𝑡 + ∑(𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡+𝑛 − 𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑆𝑡+𝑛).∆𝑦𝑖𝑡,𝑛        (2)  
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With this formulation, a shift toward (∆𝑦𝑖
𝑡,𝑛 is positive) capital-intensive industries 
(𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡+𝑛 − 𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑆𝑡+𝑛 is negative) will reduce the market sector LIS, whereas a shift 
toward labour-intensive industries (𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡+𝑛 − 𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑆𝑡+𝑛 is positive) will increase it. 
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